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PREFACE
It has been my intent to provide, by using information
that has previously been made available to the public, a
balanced perspective on the Litton shipbuilding claims prob-
lem. It is my fondest hope that future scholars, whose sources
of information have not been limited to those in the public
realm, will find this paper stimulating.
My most sincere gratitude is extended to Dr. Leslie
Darbyshire, who suggested this topic, and Dr. S. Michael Dean
for their timely and valuable criticism of the original manu-
script.
My deepest affection and love is warmly conveyed to my
loving wife, Patricia, whose understanding and patience was
a continuing source of strength throughout the research and
writing phases of this paper.
Special recognition is given to David Horowitz, Reese
Erlich, Morton Mintz, William B. Harris, Richard Austin Smith,
Jack B. Weiner, Charles J. DiBona,and Carl Rieser. Segments
of their scholarly works, while not directly quoted, have
been closely paraphrased to preserve the essential meaning.
Finally, I would like to express my sincere appreciation
to the Navy's Fleet Introduction Team and to the Business
Review Staff at the Navy's contract administration office, both
in Pascagoula, Mississippi, for their warm cooperation.
It is suggested that the reader familiarize himself with
Appendix A before reading the main text.
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I. GROWING UP WITH TEX
On July 22, 1913 » Charles Bates Thornton, "Tex" to his
friends, was born in Haskell, a small north central Texas
farm town located in Knox county. His father, Word Augustus
Thornton, was a restless adventurer who ran off shortly
after Tex was born. He accumulated a modest fortune as
an oil well fire fighter only to lose it in the 1929 market
crash. Tex seldom saw his father (later murdered by a
hitchhiking couple he befriended) and grew up as the man
of the family. Tex's mother, a firm woman determined that
her son would not go the way of his father, drilled him in
the manly art of finance. When Charles was 12, she encour-
aged him to use his earnings from odd jobs to buy land
instead of childishly frittering it away. He eventually
accumulated ko acres, and at age 14- every store in town
would accept his personal check. At age 19 he launched his
first real business venture: a combination gas station and
Chrysler-Plymouth dealership.
Later, he enrolled at the Texas Technical College in
Lubbock, where he first matriculated as an engineering
major but quickly switched to business administration (after
all, the engineer works for the business man). In his
junior year he quit Texas Tech to go to Washington, D. C.
In 193^ he landed a $1,440 per year clerk's job at the
Department of the Interior and continued his education at
7

night. In 1937 he received his Bachelor of Commercial
Science degree. For four years he wasn't able to find
that combination of business-military-political influence
which was needed to power his ascent—until he found
Robert Lovett, Wall Street banker and Assistant Secretary
of War. 1
Lovett was highly impressed with a report that the
twenty-eight-year old Thornton had written on the fin-
ancing of low-cost Federal housing. In this report,
Tex had shown his considerable ability to reduce a massive
amount of statistics and information to the basic essen-
tials .
At Lovett* s suggestion, Tex joined the army as a sec-
ond lieutenant (pre-Pearl Harbor, 19^1) and received his
first promotion within ^8 hours. A series of such pro-
motions made him one of the youngest full colonels in the
Army Air Force. He would at one time acquire as many as
2800 officers working for him around the world. Although
Tex never left his desk, he received the Legion of Merit,
a Commendation Ribbon with two oakleaf clusters, and the
Distinguished Service Medal.
Among the officers who worked for Thornton were nine
who were particularly adept with his new concept of sta-
tistical control. These nine, whose ages ranged from 26
to 32, were organized by Tex into a team--later known as
the Whiz Kids--and offered to Henry Ford II when the war
ended. Ford checked with Lovett and invited Thornton to
8

Detroit where salaries were negotiated and ranged from
$8,000 a year for the least experienced to $16,000 a year
for Tex himself. Ford didn't do too badly. The company
got four future division bosses and two presidents (including
Robert Strange McNamara who became Secretary of Defense on
Robert Lovett's nomination). At 32 Tex became the Director
of Planning, but his ambition brought him into collison
with his superiors within a few years.
In 19^8 Thornton offered his services to Hughes Air-
craft where he was accepted with some reticence on the
Company's part. Noah Dietrich, the financial head of the
Company, strongly objected to hiring him. But he was over-
ruled by two of Tex's old army buddies, Generals Harold
George and Ira C. Eaker, who were on the board. Thornton
was hired as assistant general manager of Hughes Aircraft,
a division of Hughes Tool Company. The organization
chart had it that he reported to Harold George who was the
general manager of Hughes Aircraft. At the top was Ira
C. Eaker, who was the Hughes Tool vice-president in charge
of the Aircraft Division. As in other organizations, how-
ever, the organization chart was misleading. In a memo to
Dietrich in September, 1953 » Professor Harold Koontz, an
authority in corporate management, said that Harold George
was not running the plant, but rather he was a "pleasant
spiritual leader who has furnished a symbol of unity...."
According to Koontz, a setup of this sort "....invariably
sets the stage where some aggressive individual runs with

the ball. We know, of course, that Thornton has been this
2individual." Thornton himself acknowledged that the real
power was his. "Most administrative and business manage-
ment decisions were made in my office," he said in a letter
to Howard Hughes. Ira C. Eaker described his own job as
"liaison" with Hughes Tool. According to Noah Dietrich,
both generals were mere "customer relations" men who
weren't very knowledgeable about accounting or corporate
management
.
After Tex took charge of operations he hired Roy L.
Ash, a Bank of America statistician with no accountancy
training, to be assistant comptroller ("Who's Who in Amer-
ica" listed him as chief financial officer) . Ash had been
one of Thornton's subordinates during the war. He was
born in Los Angeles on October 12, 1918. During the Depres-
sion he couldn't afford to go to college and was holding
down a clerical position at the Bank of America when he
enlisted in the Army during World War II. He was assigned
to the Army Air Corp Statistical Control Service where a
group of officers, including Robert S. McNamara and Charles
B. Thornton, were revamping procurement along business
lines. As the only enlisted man in the group he was en-
couraged to go to officer's candidate school, an experience
that was a major milestone in his career. During the war
he was invited to attend Harvard's Graduate Business School,
where the Air Force group had been based. Although he did
not have an undergraduate degree when he entered Harvard's
10

Graduate program after the war, Ash completed the two-year
curriculum in a year and a half and was graduated first in
his class in 19^7 as a Baker Scholar, the school's highest
academic award. He rejoined the Bank of America in San
Francisco where he worked in the statistical department
until Thornton hired him in 19^9*
On the organization chart, Ash was subordinate to the
division comptroller, William B. McGee. However, Ash
reported directly to Thornton several times a week. Ash
was Thornton's man and in 1951 this was made official "by
Thornton who designated Ash as "acting comptroller." Al-
though Ash was not an accountant, he was in charge of
accountants, one of whom was James 0. White, chief accountant
in the comptroller's organization. In 1951 i White began to
notice irregularities in the inventory accounts and reported
them to McGee. At first McGee thought the irregularities
were the result of errors but became convinced later that
they were deliberate. White continued to complain to McGee
until McGee finally told him that "Roy Ash was now in charge"
and that he should "accept his orders." This eventually led
to violent arguments between White and Ash; and also between
White's immediate superior, Bill Ryker, and Ash.
What happened was that Hughes Aircraft's accounting
department had lost track of costs under an Air Force fire
control contract and had submitted false affidavits to
the Air Force for progress payments to cover the costs
incurred. Thornton and Ash had found out about this, but
11

rather than put a stop to the procedure, they encouraged
it. In order to support the false affidavits, Ash ordered
his accountants to over-credit the inventory accounts --that
is, to make entries saying that more material was taken from
inventory than was actually the case. This came to White's
attention when the inventory accounts began showing credit
(negative) balances which indicated that more material was
being used than was in existence, an accounting impossibility
Again, there were only two possible reasons for this phenom-
enon: first, an error had been made, or second, it was deli-
berate. Due to the extended period for which the inventory-
accounts had shown negative balances, the possibility of
error was ruled out. In a situation such as this, a negative
inventory account indicates that something is very wrong
and corrective action should be immediately forthcoming.
The inventory accounts for Hughes Aircraft had been showing
"credit balances" for a number of months, but Ash kept
telling White to make additional entries in these accounts.
White replied that that was impossible. Ash said, "Make
3the entry anyway."
To further promote the look of authenticity, Ash would
bring his cost accountants in during the nights and on
weekends to fill out false requisition slips for the material
that was being over-credited. In addition, the slips were
wrinkled and dirtied to make them look as though shop people
had actually handled them. The Hughes Aircraft inventory had
been under physical control prior to 1951 (inventory had
12

been kept in locked cages and issued to shopworkers by
authorized personnel in the cages in return for requisition
slips) . In 1951 Ash ordered an end to the physical control
of inventory which resulted in an incommensurability
between parts being taken and requisition slips received.
This is what triggered the use of false affidavits to the
Air Force to cover the cost of the unaccounted parts. The
result was that the cost of the weapons systems was inflated
to the Air Force and that additional profits were being
hidden in the inventory accounts. This enabled Hughes
Aircraft to operate at what appeared to be a 10 percent
profit as stipulated in the contract. When White pointed
out to Ash that there was a proper way to handle inventory-
shortages by writing them off, Ash replied that he wanted
to do it this way. To further increase the amount of
money received from the Air Force in the form of progress
payments, the percentage of work completed had been inflated
on the affidavits presented to the Air Force. Ash's reason
was "so we can get the money.... Tex wants to get the money,
and we're to do it in any way we can to get it."
In the reports to Hughes Tool, however, Ash told White
to post entries that would cancel the previous over-crediting
in the inventory accounts. This made the Aircraft
Division's profits look higher. White would receive an
order from Ash to debit inventory and credit cost-of-sales
.
The entries were false. A few hours later White would
receive the entries from Ash and the figures were just
13

right to balance a predetermined profit. When White pro-
tested, Ash told him that he ought to take his orders like
"a good company man."
However, White was a good company man, and he- perceived
Ash as "being a good division man not working in the "best
interests of Hughes Tool, the parent company . In 1951
White, Ryker, and three other CPA's contacted Frederick
J. (Jack) Strickland who had headed a team for Haskins and
Sells, an independent firm of CPA's, which audited Hughes
Aircraft during the first half of 1951. At that time cer-
tain crucial records were missing. Now, through the
"revolting" CPA's, these records were secretly smuggled
out to Strickland who had left Haskins and Sells to work
for Roy N. Sherwood, comptroller of Hughes Tool's West
Coast operations. Strickland revealed his finding to Sherwood
and also to Noah Dietrich who was getting additional infor-
mation from Malcome Devore of Haskins and Sells and from
A. V. Leslie, Hughes Tool's vice president for finance,
concerning irregularities in the accounting system. After
Dietrich sent Strickland to the aircraft plant to gather
more information, he (Noah) summoned Thornton and confronted
him with what the CPA's had disclosed. Thornton said that
the contract limited them to a 10 percent rate of profit,
and that the books were adjusted to reflect that rate.
Dietrich informed Thornton that he had been improperly




Previously, the CPA's made it known that they would
quit if Thornton and Ash weren't fired, and being assured
that Thornton and Ash would he let go, the CPA's agreed to
stay on. However, Howard Hughes refused to give Noah
Dietrich the authority to fire the pair. In October, 1951 >
Dietrich confronted Thornton with a copy of a request for
progress payments backed by a false affidavit. Thornton
claimed that all defense contractors were doing the same
thing, and that he saw nothing wrong with the practice.
This was essentially the same reply that the five CPA's
received from General Harold George, supposedly the head
of the division, when they went to him with the problem
earlier.
On November 1, Ash barred Strickland from the plant
after hearing about his contacts with the CPA's.
On December 4, Haskins and Sells presented to Dietrich
a memo on the Aircraft Division's records and observations
based on statements by division personnel. Concerning
Thornton, the memo said that he "is unprincipled and
ruthless and is universally disliked cannot be
trusted." Ash, it said, "appears to be rather deeply
involved, directly or indirectly, in the deception."
(Ernest Breech, executive vice president of the Ford
Motor Company, had, moreover, described Thornton, a past
n
employee, as overly ambitious and not trustworthy).
In addition, the memo stated that division management
sees its interests as "separate and apart" from Hughes
15

Tool. Ultimately, Haskins and Sells refused to give the
division a "clean audit," ultimately causing the Mellon Na-
o
tional Bank to refuse the renewing of a $35 million loan.
In a memo to Comptroller McGee, on December 20, Ryker
said that 23 defects in the accounting system had "been
isolated and were ready for remedial action "if we re-
ceive the promised cooperation and authority." He never
received it. On January 6, 1952, Ryker and White drafted
an "ultimatum" letter to Dietrich. The next day, they
told an official from Haskins and Sells that they intended
to resign. The final ultimatum was delivered to Dietrich
on January 11, and it said the five CPA's would resign to
protect their reputations as accountants if the delays
in firing Thornton and Ash continued. Dietrich had the
CPA's in for a talk after he received their ultimatum, and
it was then that they told him the Air Force had been over-
charged millions of dollars and that the possibility of being
Q
held accountable for fraud couldn't be ruled out. Dietrich
asked the CPA's to stay on for a few more months until he
received the authority from Howard Hughes to fire Thornton
and Ash. Later, Dietrich called Thornton into his office
to discuss the problem further. During the conversation
Thornton made the statement "Noah, I want to tell you in
confidence that we are actually making more than 30 percent
on this contract, and in order to keep it, we are going to
have to hide it some place, and the best place to hide it
is in the inventory account." When Thornton was confronted
16

with evidence of the Aircraft Division's phony financial
statements to Hughes Tool, he didn't deny it. When Tex
was told about the CPA's threat to resign, he told Dietrich
to stay out of it for it was a division and not a Hughes
Tool matter.11
Meanwhile, General Eaker talked to the five CPA's one
at a time in his office to try to talk them out of resign-
ing, "but he failed. On January 23, 1952, the five men
sent Eaker their letters of resignation. Later, two more
CPA's resigned. Thornton and Ash remained. In June,
Thornton, General George, and two scientists sent a letter
to Howard Hughes himself. In the letter they accused Dietrich
of attempting to "seize personal power without regard to the
consequences to this company" and of entering into a "plot"
that could have " seriously in.jured our national security ."
Despite this counter-move, Dietrich wanted a token refund
made to the Air Force of $5 million pending a determination
12
of the actual amount owed. Thornton resisted. In early
1953 » Barry Shillito, an Air Force contracts officer,
threatened legal action. The Secretary of the Air Force,
Harold Talbott, gave Howard Hughes an ultimatum: "Either
change your management or sell the company. By God, I'll
give you 90 days." ^ By the summer $5 million had been
paid to the Air Force. Thornton said it was voluntary,
Dietrich said it wasn't. On September 1, 1953 t Howard
Hughes locked Thornton and Ash out of their offices.
Dietrich finally received the authority to fire the two
17

men. By early 195^ Hughes Aircraft had paid "back $^3.4
million to the Air Force as determined by a Haskins and
Sells audit that had been completed on October Jl, 1952.
18

II. , A REBIRTH
A characteristic common to many successful businessmen
is the ability to turn misfortune into opportunity. Tex
Thornton and Roy Ash possessed this ability. During the
time they were being forced out of Hughes Aircraft (Tex
claims it was voluntary), a massive walkout of disgruntled
higher eschelon executives and engineers was taking place.
Many of these men went on to find such conglomerate super-
stars as TRW and Teledyne. Thornton and Ash managed to
lose themselves in the shuffle. In addition, they were
able to take some talent with them: Emmett Steele,
Hughes' lobbyist in the Pentagon, became Tex's sales
manager; Hugh Jamieson became his top engineer.
In order to establish a base, Tex set up his own organ-
ization, the Electric Dynamics Corporation. In the mean-
time, Charles V. Litton, having suffered a family tragedy,
was ready to sell his small electronics firm, Litton
Industries, located in San Carlos, California. It was
a small micro-wave tube company that had supplied Hughes
with magnatrons- -vacuum tubes that emit radar impulses.
At first, Litton was reluctant to sell to Thornton. He
apparently thought Tex was untrustworthy and broke off
negotiations at one point. However, Jamieson and Steele
talked to Litton and convinced him to sell. All that
remained was the financing. After an unsuccessful solici-
tation of Industrialist Joseph Kennedy, Tex went back to
19

Robert Lovett and the Lehman Brothers investment banking
house. In his sales pitch he told them that he wanted to
start a balanced company that would become strong in the
technical environment of the future. He projected sales
of $100 million in 5 years. The Lehman partners liked his
ideas, but they thought his sales forecast was unrealistic.
Nevertheless, Joe Thomas, a Lehman partner and a fellow
Texan, agreed to provide $1.5 million to buy Litton, in
exchange for 75,000 of the original 575.000 shares. Lehman
received an option for 25,000 shares, and ^50,000 shares
were reserved for management. The $1.5 million was raised
by selling 50 investment packages to wealthy private
investors. Each package consisted of stocks and bonds
worth $29,200. Common stock cost Lehman's investors ten
cents a share. With the money in hand, Tex Thornton
purchased Litton Industries. Charles Litton insisted on
taking his $1 million in cash only. He would not accept
Litton stock.
For the fiscal year ending July 31, 195^. Litton In-
dustries had approximately $3 million in sales and $15^,000
in after tax profits. At that point the company had only
two growth alternatives. It could grow internally by
investing its earnings in assets such as inventory, plant
and equipment, or research and development. Expenditures
of this nature would expand her existing operations and
would provide the company with an increased capacity to
produce more goods for the marketplace. Growth through
20

internal means would be a gradual process, however, because
the firm would normally seek natural growth in areas where
it had an established position. Thornton felt that Litton
had to grow rapidly to survive the future technological
changes in the business environment. "We had to grow fast,"
explained Tex. "There wasn't .time to learn a business,
train people, develop markets We bought time, a market,
a product line, plant, research team, sales force. It would
2have taken years to duplicate this from scratch."
Litton, therefore, chose the second alternative:
growth through acquisition. Growth through acquisition,
or merger, is accomplished by acquiring the existing business
activities of another firm. This is most frequently achieved
by acquiring all or a substantial portion of another firm's
voting stock. There are several ways for an acquiring
company to gain possession of another firm's stock:
The stock may be obtained in a private
negotiation between the acquiring company
and a single owner or small group of
owners. In the case of a publicly owned
company, the stock may be purchased gradually
on the open market at the market price in
effect at the time ( this tends to drive
the price up significantly) . It may be
purchased by a public offer to buy all or
a stated number of shares of the company
at a price which is usually above the
market price (tender offer). This offer
may be made with or without the knowledge
and blessing of the management of the
company to be merged. As an alternative
to the payment of cash for the stock, the
acquiring company may offer its own stock
in exchange at a ratio which is expected
to be attractive. In this way the share-
holders of the merged company become
shareholders of the surviving corporation.
Apart from the possible advantages of the
21

exchange itself, there may be considerable
attraction in becoming a part of a larger
and more diversified organization.
3
Growth by acquisition through an exchange of stock is
particularly attractive to a company whose stock has a
large price/earnings ratio (P/E). If the company to be
acquired has $10 million in cash, and its stock has a
P/E of 5» then a company whose stock has a P/E of 20 can
acquire that cash (and all other net assets) for much
less paper.
With her course charted and her stock available for
exchange, Litton began to acquire other companies.
By July 31, 1957. growth from Litton 1 s internal opera-
tions still exceeded that from acquisitions. Total sales
for fiscal year 1957 were $28 million with $17 million
generated internally. Her stock was earning $1.50 per
share. In July, 1957. Litton' s stock was traded on the
New York Stock Exchange for the first time and at one
point (prior to April, 1958) sold for thirty-seven times
earnings. The stock traded in the $35 to $4-5 range.
By July, 1958, Litton had acquired seventeen other
companies. Most were little known outfits that manufactured
printed circuits, computers, servomechanisms, communication
equipment, and navigation gear. Of the seventeen acquisi-
tions, the Monroe Calculating Machine Company of Orange,
New Jersey, was the largest with sales in excess of $^0
million per year. Ninety-nine percent of Monroe's products
were mechanical desk calculators and didn't seem to fit
22

with Litton, a corporation engaged in advanced electronics.
However, Monroe had been founded in 1912 and, with the
single exception of 1932, had been profitable every year
since. Furthermore, Monroe had a well developed distribution
system that Litton would need to market a new line of com-
mercial electronic computers. Litton also saw a valuable
asset in Monroe's 350 U. S. factory sales and service
offices. Monroe became a wholly owned subsidiary of Litton
in early 1958.
By July 31, 1958, Litton* s sales were close to the $100
million mark. After taxes, profits were running at $^
million. Of the $97 million increase in sales since July,
195^» however, only $11 million had been due to sales from
the original company. The remainder had been due to sales
from the seventeen acquired companies.
Charles Litton' s company employed 250 people when Tex
Thornton and company purchased it. It had been supplying
Hughes Aircraft with the best magnatrons available at very
competitive prices. The reason, according to Dr. Norman
Moore, the president, was that their scrap rate was only
15 percent as compared to ^0 percent for some of their
competitors. In addition to Norman Moore, an expert in
the tube making business and a competent salesman, Thornton
got a top engineer and designer, a production chief, and a
general manager. This was fortunate because Tex had no
intention of running the San Carlos plant himself. Instead,
he instructed that it grow. By April 1958, it employed
23

about 1,000 people, its sales were approximately $14
million, and a new plant had been opened in Salt Lake City.
Litton' s executives were young people with bold, in-
novative ideas. The average age of the top ten executives
was forty-three, and the average age of the more than 100
people who participated in the company's incentive stock
plan was less than thirty-seven. Litton' s executives were
comprised of scientists and engineers who could transform
their technical knowledge into industrial products with
an electronic base, and businessmen who knew what the
scientists and engineers were talking about and had the
commercial instinct to choose and advance the products
that were most likely to succeed. The executives were
young mainly because their areas of expertise were quite
new (advanced physics as it relates to electronics). Two
years prior to Sputnik, Litton used its own money to set
up a space research laboratory. The company and its people
learned a great deal about electronics from the research
that was done here. According to the original plan devised
by Thornton and company, the goal was to make Litton
competitive with any company in the United States,
regardless of its size, in the field of advanced electronics.
To achieve this goal, Litton chose to enter the field of
space technology by building electronic gear for missiles.
This was the most complex of all industrial endeavors,
and a company that could succeed in building this kind of
electronic gear could succeed in building anything.
24

At Hughes Aircraft, the founders of Litton Industries
had learned what they could do. There was a big difference,
however, between the environment surrounding Hughes and
the one surrounding Litton. Hughes, having been the first
company to participate in missle work essentially had
no competition from without. Hughes had to design and
build its own components as they were not being manufactured
by other companies at the time, for these other companies
were not yet. in 19^6, interested in government work. Con-
sequently, Hughes became by necessity an integrated manu-
facturer of advanced electronic equipment. It was here that
Litton' s founders had gained their knowledge. This, unfor-
tunately, was where the strengths ceased for in 1953 » when
Litton was founded, practically all electronics companies
were deeply involved in government contracting. It would
have been a rare procurement officer indeed who would have
let a contract to a young, untried electronics company like
Litton Industries. To survive, Litton had to build high
precision electronic components. From a commercial view,
then, Hughes was paid to learn while Litton had to earn
for its knowledge. Tex knew that the larger electronics
companies (G.E., R.C.A., Sylvania, etc.) were fighting
for government work among themselves, and that size was
an important factor in succeeding. He knew that he didn't
have much time, and he also knew that bankers were not
usually receptive to entrepreneurs groping at full speed.
25

In the quest for technical talent, however, Litton was
not at a disadvantage because competition in advanced elec-
tronics was essentially a competition for brain power. Al-
though good technical talent did not come cheap, it was
not beyond the financial means of small electronics com-
panies like Litton. In addition, many of the "big brains"
in electronics preferred the intimate atmosphere associated
with the smaller companies. As Roy Ash once put it, Litton 1 s
principle job is "to attract brain power and to continue
to be attractive to it." And moreover, the founders of
Litton themselves were not lacking in the talent commodity
they sought. In addition to being hard workers, they each
had their own area of expertise which was utilized extensively
during periods of merger, acquisition, or market expansion.
When the company was looking to new markets, it was Jamieson
who advised the rest on what it would cost in the way of
research and production, and also what lead time would be
required for manufacturing. If the new move was the acquisi-
tion of another company, Jamieson would analyze the technical
aspects of their operation and give his recommendations.
Ash and Thornton would plan the financial and negotiating
strategies with Tex calling the shots in the actual bar-
gaining process. By April, 1958, Litton was being offered




A breakthrough for Litton came in the field of navigation
where the military dictated its requirements for an inertial-
guidance systems in 1950. Although numerous devices were
developed that worked, none had reached the production stage
because they were too complex, unreliable, and weighed too
much to install in aircraft (all weighed from five-hundred
to one-thousand pounds) . In 195^ > Litton started an
inertial-guidance project under the direction of a Dr.
Henry Singleton. Singleton had previously been a faculty
member at M.I.T. and was hired by Litton while he was still
on the payroll for North American. Within three years
Singleton, working with only six scientists and engineers,
designed the equipment for a practical inertial-guidance
system. The device weighed fifty pounds and the April 1958
price tag was $300,000. On a production lot of 500 • or more,
however, the price could be reduced to around $60,000 per
copy. In April of 1958, the first production run was under
way to fulfill the first order of inertial-guidance systems
that would be installed in intermediate-range missiles.
As a spin-off, Litton was selling the gyro equipment in
the system to a manufacturer of ICBM's and the computer
to another manufacturer. In order to establish a pro-
prietary position in the field, Litton had to put up its
own money for the project even though companies such as
General Electric, Sperry Rand, and Minneapolis -Honeywell
had already contracted with the military to develop such
a system using government funds. Litton' s successful
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development of the inertical-guidance system supported Tex
Thornton's conviction that a company didn't have to be large
to attract business in the electronics industry where the
basis of competition was brains.
At the same time that Litton began its inertial-navi-
gation system, it also started a project that would thrust
it into the computer field. One reason why Litton started
to develop a digital computer in May of 195^» was that it
realized then that a company attempting to progress in
the advanced electronics industry was going to have to
become highly competent in computer techniques. Thornton
and company entered the computer field much the same way they
entered the inertial-guidance and other fields. They chose
an individual to head the project and instructed him to
obtain the best digital computer group he could find. The
man they chose was George Kozmetsky, then a thirty-six year
old Harvard Business graduate with a Doctorate in Commercial
Science. Kozmetsky was chosen, rather than a physicist or
mathematician, because Litton wanted to eventually enter
all computer markets, and Kozmetsky had studied these markets
at Hughes, where Thornton had known him.
In May, 195^» Kozmetsky started the project with one
assistant. By April, 1958, the department numbered 150 and
had been engaged in profitable military work since 1955-
In addition to digital computers, the department had also
developed three electronic desk computers called digital
differential analyzers (D.D.A.'s) for engineers and
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universities. The inventor of the D.D.A. was George Steele,
a highly controversial figure in the computer logic field.
Steele was acquired by Thornton in 195^ » at Kozmetsky's
urging, when the company employing Steele was "bought by
Litton. Steele was controversial because he felt that the
computer field was suffering from "hypercomplexity ."
"The massive general-purpose computers,"
said Steele, "now sold for business data
processing are not general-purpose at all.
All they can do is high-speed calculations,
and that's not general. Furthermore, only
the universities really need this kind of
speed—1,000-odd numbers a second. Certainly
most businesses, which originate numbers
only occasionally as fast as three to five
per second, do not need it. For most busi-
nesses the G.P.C. is simply a monstrosity .5
Thus, having discerned a need, Steele conceived and
developed a small lightweight airborne computer that inte-
grated well with Litton 1 s inertial-guidance system. The
next problem was how to transfer airborne computer techno-
logy to business uses.
The progress that Litton' s computer division was making
with D.D.A. 's lead her in the direction of the Monroe Cal-
culating Company. In addition to furthering expansion,
Monroe offered a ready-made distribution system for the
new commercial electronic computers being developed by
Litton. Litton' s progress with electronic computers, on
the other hand, would enable her to provide electronic
products to Monroe in a shorter time than could her own
research department. In January, 1953, a common and
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preferred-stock trade, based on an estimate of each company's
position in i960, was completed. One share of Monroe stock
(earning $6 in 1957) was traded for one and a half shares
of Litton (earning about $1.50). By April, 1958, Monroe
was being run like all other Litton divisions--as an autonomous
operating unit. Its boss was Fred Sullivan who had been
Monroe's president prior to the merger.
Although intuition, acquisitiveness, and hard work had
played an important role in Litton Industries' early growth,
her ability to attract and retain top executive talent
throughout that developing period should not be under-
emphasized. Her top engineers and scientists were rewarded
by being allowed to work in small teams where each individual
could see for himself the extent of his contribution.
Furthermore, there was no engineering department as such,
but rather each technical project had its own research and
development group that saw its own product through to pro-
duction. Included in Litton' s "reward package" was a very
generous stock-option plan that made other incentive
schemes look miserly. When Thornton was at Hughes Aircraft,
he understood well the frustrations encountered by an
ambitious man who was denied ownership in the company he
worked for. To alleviate this frustration, Tex set up a
stock-option plan after he founded his company. Thornton,
Ash, and Jamieson bought 275.000 shares of Litton stock
at 10 cents a share. This block of common stock was
designated "partners' stock." Options on it were awarded
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to key executives, scientists, engineers, and technical
personnel according to the following: a selected employee
took an option on a block of "partners' stock" at a signi-
ficant discount from the market price. The number and price
of shares were decided by the "partners" (in April, 1958,
the "partners" consisted of over 100 people) • The options
were then "picked up" over a five year period, after which
the stock was owned by the selected individual. If he quit
before five years, he was required to sell the stock back
to the partners at cost. The plan tended to perpetuate
itself because money received from the employee was used
to buy more stock on the market. Litton did not have pro-
blems associated with top talent leaving to work for another
company, and taking valuable competitive information with
them. Yet, Litton did not hesitate to use this incentive
to lure talent away from other firms.
As of April, 1958 t Litton' s financial position could be
described as comfortable. Its asset base was enough to
support expansion, and its cash flow included all after-
tax earnings. The Company, moreover, did not pay cash
dividends. Her $2 a share earnings level on 1,680,000
shares of common provided her with about $5 million in
cash annually (depreciation included) . In the steel
industry, this would have been trivial, but in electronics,
where the need for capital funds was not great, it was




long term debt of $12 million was considered an asset as
it represented low-rate loans with low repayment require-
ments. Her total long-term debt was less than half of her
net equity which amounted to over $30 million. In addition,
Litton owned most of her buildings. Sale and leaseback of
them could have freed more cash. Finally, more money could
have been borrowed provided her earnings continued at a
satisfactory rate. But despite those obvious strong points,
Litton' s path was not all bright at the time. She was only
beginning to get into big government contracting and had to
outbid firms like R.C.A., Sperry Rand, and G.E. in order
to get the crucial missile contracts of the future. Not
only was she just entering the government market, but she
was new to the commercial market as well. In addition to
these strategic problems, Litton lost two key men by October,
1959- Hugh Jamieson, Litton' s chief engineer, resigned in
1958 to form Jamieson Industries Incorporated, a small
electronic component manufacturing firm located in Los
Angeles. There were numerous reasons for Jamieson 1 s
departure, but two appeared to predominate: first, Jamieson
thought that Tex was driving too hard a pace; and second,
Jamieson' s desire for a more centralized engineering
department ran counter to Tex's policy of maintaining a
decentralized organization for operational purposes.
The other person to leave was Emmett Steele. In October,
1959. Steele filed suit against Thornton, Ash, and Jamieson.
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In the suit, Steele claimed that he was a co-founder of the
company and that he had been deprived of stock that had
been promised him. Jamieson, dissatisfied with his share,
also suied Thornton and Ash. However, Jamieson' s suit was
settled out of court for an undisclosed amount estimated
between $3 million and $20 million. The Steele suit,
on the other hand, was destined to haunt Thornton and




Ingalls Industries had its origin in an old iron shop
in Birmingham, Alabama in 1910 . "I started out in Birming-
ham," claimed Robert Ingalls, Sr. , "with one negro, one
mule, a busted crane, and the /"Twenty- sixth street_J7
viaduct for a roof." Originally an ironworks, Ingalls
Industries diversified into the steel shipbuilding industry
in the early 20th century. This was a common phenomenon
in America around the turn of the century, because steel
ships required more organizational and technical competence
than was present in the wooden shipbuilding companies that
were patterned after simple, Thomas Jefferson style, free
enterprise operations. It was the American steel companies
that built the steel-hulled ships rather than the wooden
shipbuilding companies which eventually were, except for
a very few, forced out of business. Robert Ingalls Sr.
entered shipbuilding primarily because his son, Bob Jr.
,
persuaded him to do so. The Decator Barge Division was
established along with a shipyard in Chickasaw, Alabama
where the United States ' first all-welded tanker was built
in 1936. Bob Sr. was gratified by the fact that his ship-
building operations had turned out to be more profitable
than his ironworks, so he was ready to bid for contracts
when the government announced its plan in 1938 to build
fifty ships a year for ten years.
3^

Monro Lanier, an important personality in Ingalls
'
shipbuilding subsidiary, was instructed to bid on four
of the Maritime -Commission' s C3 cargo ships. However,
Lanier realized that if Ingalls received the contract,
the company would have to build a new yard to handle the
construction of the 12,500 ton ships. With the support
of Bob Jr., Lanier asked for $1 million dollars to build
a new yard. At first Bob Sr. said no, but Lanier eventually
persuaded him to commit the yard at Chickasaw and the
barge division at Decatur. From the barge division,
Lanier got the collateral for a $l-million bank loan. From
the yard at Chickasaw, he got enough equipment to make a
start on the fifty acres purchased in Pascagoula, Mississippi
for the new shipbuilding yard on the east bank of the
Pascagoula River. Lanier got an $ll-million contract on
four C3's for Ingalls, but it was unlikely that the small
company would ever be able to finish such massive projects.
Fortunately for Ingalls, Lanier found out that Bethlehem
Steel was getting ready to buy United Shipyards located on
Staten Island. Because Bethlehem Steel had a policy of
not rehiring any employee who had left the company vol-
untarily, and because many personnel working at United
Shipyards had voluntarily left Bethlehem Steel's shipyard
in Quincy, Massachusetts, Lanier was able to get some
badly needed talent. From United Shipyard he quickly
acquired a general manager, a chief naval architect, and
the heads of hull, machinery, electrical, and other divisions
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Blessed with this windfall of shipbuilding personnel, the
yard at Pascagoula "began to build ships at the same time
it was building itself. Keels were being laid on ways
while other ways were still under construction. Ship
subassemblies were fabricated in the ironworks at Birming-
ham and then transported by freight train to Pascagoula
where they were incorporated into the final product. Bob
Sr. took early morning trips to the new yard from Birmingham
to personally check on the new operation; When the dust
finally cleared, the shipbuilding subsidiary had produced
four well-built ships, owned its four ways, repaid the
$l-million bank loan, and deposited more money in the bank.
Of the 184 vessels built in this category by 19^7 » Ingalls
built eighty of them.
In 1951. Ingalls got its first U. S. Navy contract by
purposely bidding below cost for five LST's. Although it
lost heavily on the first ship, by the time all five were
completed, the books were out of the red due to the learning
curve (increased labor efficiency and decreasing costs).
In addition, Ingalls was the first of several yards building
that type of ship to complete its contract. Now that the
Navy market had been entered, Ingalls looked toward the
most prestigious navy work , that of building destroyers
and submarines. To win favor for these contracts, Lanier
allocated more than $5 million to the shipyard to increase
its capabilities. Although no Navy commitment had been
given either before or after the shipyard had been modernized
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and expanded, Ingalls realized that the Navy would welcome
almost anyone who could reduce costs and increase quality.
In 1955 > $500,000 was provided to Lanier to set up a sub-
marine and nuclear training program. In 1956, Ingalls got
its first submarine contract, and in 1957 » received two
nuclear submarine contracts. At the time, the Navy was
adhering to a balance-of-forces concept to counter the
Russian submarine threat and to transport men and materials
across the surface of the seas to strategic points on the
globe. In the late 1950' s, many influential Navy men
felt that the Russians were making a strategic mistake by
concentrating their sea power in a submarine force. The
rationale for this thinking was the belief that the Russians,
without a strong surface fleet, would not be able to use
the world's sea lanes to their advantage even if their
submarine forces destroyed America's surface fleet. Result-
ing from this point of view, the United States Navy concen-
trated its resources on carriers, destroyers, missile ships,
and nuclear submarines. By 1958, twenty- two nuclear sub-
marines had been authorized and seven more had been requested
for fiscal '59. Concurrently, Senator Jackson of Washington
was pressing for the construction of at least a hundred
nuclear subs. On the twentieth anniversary of Ingalls
Shipbuilding Company, in the spring of 1958, the yard was
enjoying its largest backlog ever with its design department
ready to prepare all the drawings for five 11,000-ton
freighters destined for the Lykes Brothers Steamship
37

Company. Its atomic commercial division was working on a
containment vessel, and on its ways or tied to its fitting
piers were: two destroyers, an atomic tanker, three sub-
marines, an offshore mobile oil drilling barge, two tug-
boats, a cement carrier, and two ocean liners for Moore-
McCormack. One of the ocean liners, the Argentina, was
Ingalls' 189th ship.
Despite Ingalls' seemingly envious position, there
remained two crucial problems that were to result in the
sale of the yard in 1961. One problem was the lack of
depth in the shipyards top management eschelons; the other
was the family feud between Robert Ingalls Jr. and his
parents. The thinness of top management was largely the
result of old Bob's authoritarian style of management that
led to tight estimating and cost control at the expense of
longe range operational plans and market forecasting.
Robert Sr. was concerned primarily with profits in the
here and now, rather than potential for the future, and
he was usually reluctant to expand for fear that he would
lose control of what was essentially a one man operation.
One method he used to cut costs was to maintain a heavy
day-to-day operational workload for his executives. This
not only reduced administrative costs, but also prevented
his executives from being able to find the time to familiar-
ize themselves with the operations of other Ingalls div-
isions, or to think about such vital questions as where
to diversity, where to invest, where to expand, or what
market forecasting should be undertaken. The result of
38

his leadership style and cost cutting obsession was a
small-sphered, subservient management which became accus-
tomed to working within the parameters allowed by the boss.
When the old man died in 1951. these deficiencies became
more obvious as the younger Ingalls off-spring was not
the authoritarian manager the Ingalls management system
required. In contradistinction, Robert Jr. was more inter-
ested in yachts, money, status, and power than he was in
the daily chores required in the running of the company.
The young man's interests, of course, had been a source
of irritation to his father while he (the father) was alive.
He had restricted his son's interests and required him to
perform the more routine chores in the business. Although
old Bob gave money and stock to his son in dribbles, by
19^8 the younger Ingalls, who had been president for seven
years, owned ^,501 of Ingalls* 15,000 shares of stock and
was enjoying an income of $^5 .000 a year. Of young Bob's
four interests, only power had not come into his grasp
because his father had no intention of grooming a successor,
especially one that reminded him that he was "living on
2
borrowed time," as his son had on occasion. As a result
young Bob was intentionally denied the authority or experi-
ence that would have enabled him to competently hold down
the No. 2 job in the company. In 19^8, the conflict between
father and son came to a head when young Bob decided to
remarry after being divorced only a few months . The older
Ingalls' objection to his son's second marriage was rooted
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in the belief that two sets of children in one family
wouldn't get along together. The second marriage took
place, however, and Robert Sr. removed his son from the
payroll and later attempted to divest him of his stock,
on grounds that the company had the option to purchase the
stock in the event of "retirement" or death. What followed
was a series of lawsuits initiated by Robert Jr. to retain
his stock and re-establish his position in the company.
Young Bob's legal actions, of course, were met by counter-
suits from his father, and the bitter litigation that
ensued left a lasting impression on the personality of
the younger Ingalls. Executives that Robert Ingalls Jr.
had worked with testified, on the request of his mother
and father, to his incompetence and irresponsibility. He
was accused of threatening to kill his father and of actually
beating him in the presence of his mother. Robert Sr. was
so committed, in principle, against his son's position
that when the Supreme Court finally ruled in favor of
young Bob, the father suffered a stroke and died in 1951'
Young Ingalls became the chairman of the company and in
1952, the company bought back and retired the 2,287 shares
of company stock that was in Robert Ingalls Sr.'s estate.
Much of the underlying strength in Ingalls shipbuilding
could be attributed to Robert Sr.'s vitality and the talents
of two men: Lanier, vice chairman of the board, and
William R. Guest, president of Ingalls Shipbuilding Cor-
poration. But now the number one Ingalls had died and
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these two talented men were approaching retirement age.
Although the younger Ingalls was known to be controlling
on occasion, he was generally content to let Lanier and
Guest run the shipbuilding subsidiary. Ingalls continued
along without an organizational plan, a sense of direction
or a second level of management. In the spring of 1958.
young Bob's mother filed a suit to regain the 2,287 shares
of stock for her husband's estate. Following this, the
shipbuilding subsidiary finished the contract on the two
liners for Moore-McCormack with a $17 million loss which
caused Ingalls Industries to post a $^ million loss in 1961.
The reasons for the loss were a steel strike (which caused
delays), a steel price increase (the contract was fixed-
price), and a shake-up in management (Guest and Lanier
left the company). These factors, plus inept management,
material shortages, and mistakes resulted in a record loss
on the two ships. Ingalls Jr. faced tremendous criticism
for the loss, but the crucial blow came when the courts
ruled in favor of his mother on the lawsuit to regain the
aforementioned 2,287 shares of stock. The stock was returned
to the late Ingalls Sr.'s estate where Mrs. Ingalls' lawyer,
James A. Simpson, had the right to vote it because he was
a co-trustee. This decreased young Bob's control in the
company and eventually caused him to sell out his share of
the business for $^ million.
But, the problems did not end. Many of the younger
executives quit the corporation, convinced that the problems
were insurmountable. As the situation deteriorated, the

Navy granted Ingalls Shipbuilding $9 million in credit,
but by 1961 the shipbuilding subsidiary had been put up
for sale. With a value estimated at $^0 million to $60
million (including and accounting for $5 million worth
of improvements from 1953 to 1955) » the subsidiary was
sold for $8 million. The buyer: Litton Industries.
^2

IV. GROWING UP WITH LITTON
At first Litton was not interested in Ingalls . The
closer Litton looked at the shipyard, however, the more
they came to realize that the nuclear submarines on the
ways at Pascagoula were logical destinations for the pro-
ducts being produced by Litton' s rapidly expanding elec-
tronics empire. Furthermore, Litton believed that the
United States Government would be needing more of these
submarines in the future to counter Russia's undersea
threat. Litton also believed that, within 10 years, the
United States Navy would be contracting out complete
weapons systems to private contractors whereas in 1961
the shipyards were merely hull fabricators and parts
assemblers. By purchasing Ingalls Shipyard below book
value, Litton hoped to establish an advantageous position
in order to take advantage of the increased Navy orders
they felt were sure to come
.
On September 8, 1961 the election of Roy Ash as Litton'
s
president was announced by Tex Thornton. Previously Tex
had been president and chairman of the board while Ash had
been executive vice president. Thornton also announced to
the board of directors that sales for the fiscal year end-
ing July 31, 1961 had been approximately $2^5.000,000 or
about a 30 percent increase from $187,761,2^2 in the pre-
ceding year. Share earnings, after preferred stock dividends,
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were estimated at $2.30 for the year, up 33 percent from
$1.72 a year earlier.
In 1962, the legal preparation of Emmett Steele's
1959 lawsuit was taking place. Harold Rhoden, Steele's
attorney, took a deposition from Noah Dietrich in pre-
paration for the trial. In the deposition Dietrich related
the events surrounding the accounting irregularities at
Hughes Aircraft and the part that Tex Thornton had played.
Thornton claimed that Dietrich had been "maliciously de-
famatory" and filed a $^4-0 million slander suit against
the Hughes' executive. In addition, Litton sent a letter
to 12,000 employees in which they accused Dietrich of
"irresponsible and malicious attacks." The letter also
claimed as "completely false" Dietrich's charges that the
Air Force had been over charged as a result of improper
2
accounting practices at Hughes Aircraft. In response,
Noah Dietrich filed a libel suit against Thornton and
Litton, in which he asked for ^0 cents in actual and $1
million in punitive damages.
By May, 1963, after nearly a decade of operation, Litton'
s
sales had risen from about $9 million for its first year of
business to an estimated $5^0 million for the fiscal year
ending July 31, 1963. Her assets had grown from $7,600,000
to $333 million during the same period. Litton was more
than just an electronics company. Her business ranged
from producing military command and control systems to
manufacturing and assembling business machines and electronic
Zj4

computers. She was deeply committed in dozens of fields
and heavily invested in shipbuilding through which she hoped
to find new outlets for her electronic components. $1,000
invested in her stock in 1953 would have been worth $85,000
by May, 1963 (had Charles Litton taken his $1 million in
Litton stock it would have been worth $85 million) . Litton
had also used her stock to acquire some 37 companies.
Earning per share had gone from 9 cents in 1955 to $2.16
by May, 1963 » and her return on net worth was holding at
an impressive 16 percent. Litton had never paid any cash
dividends, but her investors were sticking with her with
the belief that she would continue to grow. She had paid
four stock dividends and her common stock, selling around
$65 per share, had split twice. Wall Street, however,
had its skeptics. They felt that the stock was -overpriced
at a 30 to 1 price earnings ratio and that Litton would
not be able to sustain her sales growth at 30 to 50 percent
a year. If her growth slows many felt her stock would
drop rapidly in price. In addition, her stock had been
heavily short traded on occasion. Her after tax profit
on sales was approximately b.l percent which was considered
fair in electronics but not spectacular. Others were look-
ing for organizational problems due to her rapid growth
and wide diversification.
Litton' s net cash flow was approximately $3^ million
for fiscal year 1963 and her long term debt was relatively
light which meant that she could buy more companies if she
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wanted to. Although acquisitions played a major role in
Litton 1 s growth, they' were not the sole reason for her
expansion. Once a company had "been acquired, Litton would
develop that company's existing market. She would also
create new markets for her own products. Some of her inter-
nal growth was beginning to pay off in that her inertial
guidance and military command and control systems were
entering the more profitable stages of large-scale production
where fixed-price contracts were substituted for cost-plus-
fixed-fee contracts. About 55 percent of Litton 1 s sales
were to military consumers although she had no major com-
mitment to any one military project. At the same time,
Litton was looking to the commercial market as a future out-
let for her business machines and microwave cooking ovens
as well as other products. By 1963, Litton* s 36 divisions
had about ^3,000 employees located in 71 plants in the
United States and nine foreign countries.
Roy Ash handled the internal day to day operations of
the company while Thornton concerned himself with the exter-
nal environment. No division reported directly to Ash al-
though key men were permitted to enter either Ash's or
Thornton's office at any time. The organization remained
decentralized for day to day operations, but centralized
for major investment decisions. Litton* s headquarters
were staffed by approximately 90 people, quite small by
comparative standards. There were many entrepreneurial
types on the overworked staff and no standing committees.






$ 85 million 16%
$ ^9 million 9%
$ ^9 million 9%
$200 million 37%
responsibilities to Ash he set up five groups of divi-
sions. By May, 1963. the five groups with their respec-








Although the mix of sales was shifted in favor of the
military, Thornton saw the trend as being temporary because
the greatest long term potential remained in the commercial
sector. Much of the credit for Litton' s success could be
attributed to her sense of timing. When other companies were
contracting for whole military systems, Litton was concen-
trating on electronic components
.
In inertial guidance,
Litton went for manned military planes instead of the glam-
orous missile market. The planes turned out to be more
lucrative than predicted by most companies. In the computer
field, Litton developed small, inexpensive ones instead of
the large, general purpose units. Moreover, when the com-
petition was looking toward space, Litton looked to the sea
and purchased Ingalls shipbuilding to obtain a foothold
in the nuclear submarine market.
^7

Litton' s timing was due to Thornton's brilliant, in-
tuitive mind. Thornton was different things to different
people. To some he was an ambitious entrepreneur; to others
he was a promoter. He was described as a great dreamer;
others pictured him as a dreadful worrier. He was shy in
public for fear of looking awkward, but in business nego-
tiations his nerves were like steel. He was articulate
and inarticulate and had varying moods. Roy Ash, on the
other hand, possessed a cool, logical, financial mind.
Together, Thornton and Ash were a formidable pair.
Litton' s successful commercial endeavors, however,
were tempered somewhat by the courts. Emmett Steele's
case was brought to trial in October, 196^ , and six months
later, the jury awarded Steele $7.5 million ($5,182,885
in damages with 7 percent interest from December 5» 1958
until April 19, 19&5) • The damages were awarded against
Litton Industries, Inc., Charles B. Thornton, Roy L. Ash,
Hugh W. Jamieson (then the chairman of Jamieson Industries
in Los Angeles) , and the Electro Dynamics Stock Trust Fund
(a partnership of Messrs. Thornton, Ash, and Jamieson).
The jury awarded the damages on two counts: Breach of
contract, and fraud and deceit. There was no verdict on
a third count of conspiracy. Immediately after the jury
delivered its verdict to the court, the judge, Frederick
W. M'ahl, issued an 11-page memorandum disputing the jury's
decision. He ordered a stay of proceedings for an indefinite
time period and refused to enter the jury's judgement.
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Steele had charged that Thornton had broken a promise to
give him a one-fifth share of original Litton stock. He
claimed that Thornton was to have received a two-fifths
share while Ash, Jamieson, and himself were to have received
a one-fifth share apiece. With stock splits and dividends,
Steele's share would have totaled 278,000 shares on
April 29, 1965. and would have been worth $2^.5 million.
Judge Mahl, however, ruled against Steele in an accompany-
ing equity suit to gain possession of his one-fifth share
of stock. During the trial, Charles Litton, when called as
a witness, claimed that he sold his company to four men.
To dispute Steele's claim that he was one of the founders
Litton' s attorneys attempted to belittle his importance in
the company by contrasting his privileges to those of
Thornton. They said that Steele did not possess a company
car whereas Tex did. They also pointed out that Thornton's
office was larger and better equipped than Steele's, and
that it had private convenience facilities. "Translation:
Tex Thornton had an executive washroom."^
Three months later, in July, a state superior court
in Los Angeles, California, formally entered the jury's
verdict into the record. Steele's total award came to
$7.6 million when interest ($116,365) for the 81 days since
the April verdict was added in. Mr. Steele's lawyer had
filed a dismissal of the equity suit for the Litton shares
which took the issue out of Judge Mahl's jurisdiction.
Litton' s motion to vacate the dismissal was denied by
Zj.9

Judge Mahl, the district court of appeals, and the state
supreme court.
By July, 1965 » Litton was approaching an annual sales
figure of $900 million. In a little more than eleven years,
she had acquired bo additional companies. She had three
basic rules for merger situations:
1. The company being acquired had to fit
with Litton* s product and market planning.
2. The company had to have strong management.
If it didn't, Litton had to have remedies.
3. If the first two conditions were met then
Litton would analyze the financial aspects,
price, potential return on investment, etc.
Litton was able to sidestep Washington's attempt to
enforce anti-trust legislation by claiming that she was
a challenger rather than a dominating force in the fields
that she had entered.
By May, 1966, Litton' s sales had increased by more
than 30,000 percent since 195^ to $915-6 million annually.
Her profits were running at almost $^-0 million a year or
$1.68 per share. She was the twenty- sixth largest industrial
employer in the United States with a daily payroll of
approximately $2 million. She had undergone three two-for-
one stock splits and had paid two and a half percent stock
dividends for eight years. She produced 6,000 products
and employed 70,000 personnel in 1^6 plants and laboratories
located in 12 states and 21 foreign countries. One-third
of Litton* s sales were in business equipment, another third
was in industrial and professional products, and the last
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third was in defense and space. Thornton was predicting
that the $2 billion sales figure would be reached within
four to six years. Furthermore, Litton was able to generate
a yearly cash flow of around $80 million.
Litton' s leadership was aware of the rapid changes
taking place—technological as well as political, social,
and economic. Ash and Thornton observed that the U. S.
had made more scientific and technological progress during
the last twenty years than in the sum total of recorded
history, and that the rate of progress would double during
the next ten years. Furthermore, Litton believed that change
created opportunities. To handle the changing environment,
Litton emphasized a decentralized organization along with
giving her personnel authority commensurate with responsi-
bility at the division level. Joseph S. Imirie, who was
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force before he came to
Litton in late 1963. headed the industrial and professional
group, which accounted for 15 percent of sales. Imirie
once stated, "At the local level, 'we have everything mean-
ingful to run the business. There's simply no ' lese-majeste'
or privilege of office at Litton, and we don't troupe down
the hall to Ash's office weekly or monthly." Another
Litton executive, Gordon Murphy (headed Litton' s Data Sys-
tems division) , said, "The key to Litton is that small
units are run like separate companies. The program manager
controls all the dough, and nobody gets paid in proportion
to the number of people working for him."
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Litton' s financial strength, decentralized organization,
and talented leadership were not the only reasons for her
success. Thornton's political contacts in Washington
couldn't have hurt his company's business. When Thornton
visited the capital city, he frequently 'ate breakfast with
the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, who at one time
worked for him. In addition, Thornton hired two of McNamara'
s
men in the fall of 19&3* John H. Rubel, Assistant Secretary
of Defense, was hired as a Litton vice-president in September.
A month later, Joseph S. Imirie was on Litton' s payroll.
Critics have suggested that Litton' s access to the Pentagon
has been a key to her good fortunate in the business world.
Despite Litton' s business acumen, however, the courts
consistently were there to take the edge off of her commercial
ecstasy. Thornton's slander suit against Noah Dietrich had
been rejected, first, by the Superior Court of Los Angeles
and, in September, 1966, by the Court of Appeals.
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V. LITTON CROSSES THE RIVER
In January, 1966, an article entitled "Can we Modernize
U. S. Shipbuilding?" appeared in the United States Naval
Institute Proceedings . Lieutenant Commander Charles J.
DiBona, the author, pointed out the inefficiencies inher-
ent in the United States shipbuilding industry and in the
manner in which the U. S. Navy procured its warships. When
Robert S. McNamara became Secretary of Defense, one of
the changes he made was to allocate funds to specific mili-
tary missions rather than to each service separately as
had been the tradition before he took office. DiBona
felt that in order for the U. S. Navy to compete effectively
with the other services for these funds it was going to
have to devise more efficient method to procure its ships.
This would not be a trivial task, because the American ship-
building industry (by law, the U. S. Navy's sole source for
ship procurement) was the world's most inefficient.
During World War II, America built thousands of ships
to transport and protect the massive amounts of men and
material needed to prosecute the war. When hostilities
ended, however, the resulting glut of ships caused the
United States' shipbuilding industry to shrink drastically
in output. This decline in shipbuilding was so severe that
by 1966 the industry still had not recovered. This boom-
bust phenomenon also occured during and after World War I.
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In fact, the only periods in history when the American
steel shipbuilding industry had grown and prospered had
been during the two world wars . Even then ships for the
navy and the merchant marine were paid for by the government
.
As late as January, 1966, American shipbuilders were limited
almost entirely to producing commercial ships, for which
the government subsidized half the cost, and naval ships,
for which the government paid all, because foreign ship-
building companies were able to produce better ships cheaper
and more efficiently. By then foreign nations, mostly
Japan, were producing the vast majority of the world's
ships. In 1966 Japan produced 9.737.000 dwt; W. Germany
2 3produced 1,658,000 dwt; Sweden, 1,805.000 dwt; J and the
United States, 198,^66 dwt. From 1967 to 1971 Japan pro-
duced 50.2 percent of the world's deadweight tonnage;
Sweden produced 8.18 percent; W. Germany produced 6.93
percent; and the United States produced 1.55 percent.
It would be instructive to reflect, for a moment, upon
the economics of shipbuilding. Shipbuilding, not surprisingly,
is very closely related to the shipping industry; the ship-
ping industry, in turn, is dependent upon world economic
growth. This dependency comes about for two basic reasons.
First, as the world's industrialized nation's mature, they
become increasingly more dependent upon resources imported
from other countries. These resources, of course, are
transported across the world's oceans by ship. Second,
as the developing countries grow, they become dependent
5^

upon world trade to sustain their expanding economies..
This world trade is also carried out on ships. The demand
for shipping, therefore, is a function of the demand for
things to be shipped. The demands put upon the shipping
industry, however, are cyclical due to economic, political
and military considerations. Examples of political and
military pressures working to increase the demand for
ships were World War I, World War II, and the Suez Canal
crisis in 1956. The introduction of airline passenger
travel across the oceans is a good example of an economic
force decreasing the need for shipping. Prior to passenger
airliners, people travelled across the seas on ships.
Another example of a decrease in the demand for shipping
occurred in 1933 > in "the middle of the worldwide depres-
sion, when world trade was reduced to the bare minimum.
Despite the cyclical nature of shipping, however, the
industry had expanded dramatically from 1950 to 1970.
Shipbuilding, naturally, responds to the needs of
the shipping industry. Shipbuilding, therefore, is cyclical.
In fact, the cyclical movements of the shipbuilding industry
are of a longer duration than the movements of most durable
goods industries. The cyclical nature of shipbuilding
presents some interesting problems. The biggest problem
among shipbuilders is the difficulty encountered in main-
taining a large, stable backlog of shipbuilding orders
(orderbook). Without a stable orderbook, it is difficult
(if not impossible) for shipyards to maintain a stable
workforce, especially in the skilled areas. During slack
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building periods it has been common for shipyards to lay-
off fifty to seventy percent of their workforce. When the
shipbuilding lull ends, the shipyards find it most difficult
to rehire the most productive skilled workers, because they
have usually found other work. Many of the workers go into
the construction industry where the pay is better. The
result, then, has been a sharp chronic fluctuation in the
employment levels of most classes of skilled workers.
The absence of a stable orderbook, moreover, has been
responsible for additional shortcomings. Without a stable
workload, setting up facilities for series production is
both impractical and uneconomical. Furthermore, if the
shipbuilder had a large orderbook, he could schedule his
material delivery over shorter periods of time which would
result in inventory savings, because he would be carrying
less material in inventory at any one time.
Another problem associated with the cyclical nature
of shipbuilding is that ship construction is a long process,
and the time from contract signing to ship delivery can
span the cycles of world shipping demand. This increases
the risk to both the buyer and the builder.
By the late 1960's most American shipyards had been
acquired by conglomerate corporations. These corporations,
Litton in particular, had sensed that opportunities were
waiting for them in shipbuilding. With the old steel
companies ready to sell out, the aerospace industry moved
in. Furthermore, it was easier for a conglomerate to raise
the money needed for shipyard capital investment.
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Nevertheless, the shipyard still had to compete with
the other conglomerate divisions for investment dollars.
One drawback to the conglomerate control of shipyards was
that the financial control of the operation was vested in
directors who had little knowledge of shipbuilding.
In foreign shipbuilding nations the government plays
a crucial role in shipbuilding operations. Foreign govern-
ments attempt to stabilize the shipbuilding orderbook by
directing large backorder logs to their respective ship-
yards. In Japan, for example, shipbuilding is a national
policy, because that country is dependent upon shipping
to acquire needed imports.
In the United States, however, there was no coherent
government policy on shipbuilding. Until 1970, United
States shipyards were dependent upon Naval ship construction
for survival. The lack of a stable, long-range shipbuilding
budget for the Navy (due to Congressional considerations
and the ship surplus resulting from World War II) made
matters even worse. The result was an inefficient American
shipbuilding industry when compared to other nations.
In contrast, the United States' aircraft industry was
the world's most efficient and was the leading supplier of
aircraft to the world market. Furthermore, the industry
did not need or receive direct subsidies to enable it to
compete against foreign aircraft industries whose wage
rates were lower. When other nations needed airplanes,
they came to the United States. When they needed ships,
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they stayed away. DiBona, therefore, suggested that the
production and procurement of ships should "be patterned
after that for aircraft. Specifically, he recommended
the standardization of designs, the production of ships
in large blocks (25 to 35) » and the awarding to one firm
7the contract for all ships of one design. If shipbuilders
knew beforehand that they would be receiving the total
award instead of just a small port, they would be motivated
to modernize their production facilities so they could
reduce costs on a mass production basis. In addition,
DiBona suggested that the Navy should alter its procurement
procedure so that the shipbuilder would be bidding on the
design phase as well as the ship's production. Until this
point, the Navy designed its own ships, using naval architects,
and then presented the design to shipbuilders for their
bids. DiBona was suggesting that the Navy define the task
the ship was to accomplish and then present this to the
shipbuilding firms. They, in turn, would design the ship
and present the design (and the cost) to the Navy. The
Navy would then choose the best design/price combination
and award the contract to that company. DiBona, of course,
was hinting that the United States shipbuilders should
pattern their yards after the automated shipyards in Japan,
Germany, and Sweden. These countries produced ships in a
modular fashion instead of traditionally laying the keel
and building upwards. By using modular construction, they
were able to build ships in an assembly-line manner which
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resulted in better ships for less money. By building ships
in the modular mode, American shipbuilders would be able
to take advantage of assembly-line economies to reduce
costs. In addition, there was a significant body of
evidence to suggest that a learning curve existed for ship-
building. This learning curve could be attributed to
organizational and individual learning at the specific
yard plus cost savings due to the procurement of manufac-
tured components en masse from subcontractors, because the
producers of these components also learned from series
o
production. Essentially, DiBona was advocating a multi-
year total package procurement concept for naval ship ac-
quisition. This concept, of course, was not new, for the
defense department, under McNamara, had been using this
concept to procure aircraft for a number of years.
Interestingly enough, DiBona was not the only indivi-
dual thinking along these lines. In fact, during the mid-
60' s, a team of design experts from Litton Industries had
toured the world's shipyards to get first hand information
on the modular ship construction in progress at the ship-
yards in Germany, Sweden, and Japan. Their findings pre-
cipitated the expansion of Ingalls shipyard to include the
West bank of the Pascagoula river. Before the new yard
could be built, however, the company had to obtain $100
million for the purchase of the land on the West bank and
for the construction of the yard itself. The federal govern-
ment was unwilling to finance the expansion, so Litton went
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to the capital of Mississippi and threatened to move their
whole shipbuilding operation out of the state if they didn't
receive the required backing. Governor Johnson called an
emergency legislative session together to pass a $130 mil-
lion bond issue for the new yard. In October, I967, the
bond issue was presented to the Mississippi voters. It was
overwhelmingly approved. The state of Mississippi floated
the $130 million (including $30 million for interest) bond
issue to finance the construction of the new yard. The
yard was then leased to Litton for a thirty year period
after which the yard would be owned free and clear by Litton
Industries. Furthermore, Litton would not have to start
paying the $9 million a year lease payments until 1972.
The company could then invest $125 million ($130 million
minus $5 for underwriting costs) and use the income to
build a financial buffer from which it could draw funds to
pay the lease when the payments became due. In return,
the state of Mississippi was expected to get an additional
12,000 job openings at the new yard. The profits, how-
ever, were to go to Litton. Groundbreaking ceremonies
for the 6ll-acre West bank shipyard took place on January 11,
1968.
Strangely enough, Litton had no firm commitments from
the Navy for new ship construction at the time the lease
-
purchase agreement was signed with the state of Mississippi.
However, she did have reason to believe that navy contracts
were forthcoming. The procedure for bidding on ship design
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and production contracts described by DiBona was actually
adopted by the Navy after 1963. The procedure, known as
CF-CD (Contract Formulation: Contract Definition), was
worked out for the Department of Defense by John H. Rubel
while he was assistant secretary of Defense under McNamara.
Rubel, of course, had been working for Litton since the
fall of 1963.
In November, 1965* McNamara announced executive branch
approval of the Navy's Fast Deployment Logistics (FDL)
ship program. As a major part of the program to reduce
the costs of stationing U. S. troops overseas, the ships
(about thirty of them) were to be strategically located
throughout the world where they could be used to supply
American troops (flown in by the Air Forces' C-5A aircraft)
at a moments notice to help suppress fire-fights on any
part of the globe. This ship program was the first to
be handled under the Navy's new weapons systems acquisition
approach patterned after Rubel' s CF-CD. Although several
shipbuilding companies entered the competition, only three
(Litton, Lockheed, General Dynamics) made it to the final
stage. Interestingly enough, all three had been new entrants
into shipbuilding. Each got $5 million from the government
to finish both the FDL design plans and a new shipyard (it
was recognized that whoever won the award was going to have
to build a new automated shipyard) . Litton eventually won
the contract because climate ruled out New England and
highly unionized labor eliminated the West Coast. Besides,
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the United States* domestic colony of cheap labor was located
in the South; more specifically, Pascagoula (the fact that
Rubel was working for Litton didn't reduce her chances of
winning the award)
.
Despite Litton' s success at winning the $2 billion
prize, Congress refused twice (both in I967 and 1968) to
appropriate the needed money. The legislature did not
want to project the impression the United States was as-
suming the role of the "world's policeman" by funding the
FDL program. Litton was not worried, however, because there
would be other shipbuilding contracts, besides, the conglo-
merate had less than $3 million of her own money tied up
in both the new yard and the FDL program.
Once again, however, Litton' s seemingly advantageous
position was tempered. In January, 1968, a letter was sent
to Litton stockholders advising them that the company's net
earnings would show a sharp decline for the 2nd quarter of
fiscal year 1968. After 57 consecutive quarters of earnings
increases Litton suffered her 1st earnings decline ever.
Earnings fell to $7,205,000 for the 2nd quarter of fiscal
year 1968 with earnings per share of 21 cents. This was
a 30 percent drop from year earlier earnings of $16,^37.000
or 63 cents a share. Wall Street's reaction was savage and
quick. In one week Litton' s stock dropped some 18 points.
By March the stock was selling at half its I967-I968 high
of $120,375. What was unsettling to investors was the
surprise to management of the earnings drop. Up until the
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time of the announcement, management was apparently unaware
of the deteriorating situation. Skeptics thought that the
conglomerate was too large and diversified to control ef-
fectively, and that a need existed for the development of
a more rigorous cost control system that would better
inform top management of an unhealthy situation. The con-
ditions were right to precipitate a loss of faith in
Litton' s decentralized style of management. Litton did
not like being called a conglomerate because a conglomerate's
products were generally unrelated thereby making the manage-
ment of their production and distribution more difficult
due to the different expertises required. Litton wanted,
instead, to be called a diversified company, because the
products of such a company had a common band and therefore
were easier to manage. Litton claimed that all her products
were related because they all had an electronic foundation.
Critics, however, couldn't draw the connection between
nuclear submarines and micro-wave ovens.
Although Litton claimed that the decline was due to
"certain earlier deficiences of management personnel," the
actual causes were more complex. First, the company had
been forced to write off $8 million in excess costs on
commercial shipbuilding contracts that had been signed in
196^ and I965. In her previous Navy work, Litton had
become accustomed to the cost plus shipbuilding contracts
where the tab for excess costs had been picked up by the
government. According to the estimates of a former Litton
63

executive, it had been Litton' s normal practice to renego-
tiate contracts to one and half times their original value
during the course of development and production. In the
civilian environment, however, contract administrators
were not so generous. Litton* s underestimation of costs
on her civilian shipbuilding contracts was more likely to
result in her having to make up the difference- out of her
own pocket. Working for the government had other advantages
also. Little or no capital was required on the part of the
contractor and errors were not capitalized upon by civilian
competitors
.
Second, Litton had been undergoing a period of top manage-
ment personnel attrition. Litton, as in most organizations,
had room for only a few men at the top of her management
pyramid. Unfortunately, Thornton and Ash were relatively
young which meant that no one was going to move into their
positions as president or chairman in the near future. This
was particularly discouraging to the men who ran Litton'
s
divisions and subsidiaries, because in most cases, these
men were already running independent companies when they
were acquired by Litton. Litton' s policy, it can be recalled,
was to retain these men in their respective positions as
the presidents of the newly acquired subsidiaries. At
first the arrangement was satisfactory to all concerned,
but because these individuals had entrepreneurial dirves,
they became dissatisfied with their chances of moving up
within Litton' s organizational structure. Many left in
6^

the mid-60' s to take responsible positions in such com-
panies as Walter Kidde & Co. Inc., Hunt Foods & Industries,
Inc., and Teledyne , Inc. to mention just a few. The men
who left referred to themselves as "Lidos" (short for
Litton Industries Dropouts) and took with them the manage-
ment philosophy learned at Litton. In short, Litton "became
a "business school where top executives could obtain expe-
rience plus practical schooling they could take to other
companies in their rise up the corporate pyramid. In
each such case, however, another company's gain was Litton'
s
loss.
The third reason for Litton' s drop in earnings was the
trouble that occurred in her business -equipment group.
Labor strikes in this group caused the loss of 30 , 000 man-
weeks for the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 1968. In addition,
the delay in getting her new Royal electric typewriter to
market, the failure of her office furniture and Monroe
electronic calculator sales to meet planned growth rates,
and the heavier than expected losses in the introduction of
her new office-copying machine, the Royfax, had an effect
on the group's 2nd quarter performance.
At this point it would be interesting to ponder, for
a moment, about the basis of Litton' s financial strength
up to early 1968 . The traditional concept of business
growth leaves the onlooker with the image of a company
creating and selling products at a resonable profit, then
turning around and putting the excess earnings back into
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new plant and equipment to produce more products to finance
additional growth internally. Litton, however, was not a
traditional firm. Only a fraction of her growth thru I968
could be attributed to the traditional method of internal
building. Buying, not building, was Litton' s formula for
growth. Furthermore, her stock was the "money" used to
purchase additional firms. Therefore, it was in Litton'
s
best interest to take measures that would maintain or in-
crease the value of her stock. The value of a company's
stock, however, is not calculated by adding up the value
of a company's tangible assets, rather, it is determined
by what others will be willing to pay for it; and what
others are willing to pay will depend upon their expecta-
tions of the stock's future value. If they expect the value
to rise in the future, they will be willing to pay a higher
price in the present. The expectations, of course, are
grounded in the potential for real corporate growth in
both assets and earnings.
Expectations, however, are largely intuitive, and intu-
ition can be influenced by intangible factors. As Jack
Dreyfus, head of one of the biggest mutual funds on Wall
Street, once said:
Take a nice little company that's been making
shoelaces for 4-0 years and sells at a respectable
six-times-earnings ratio. Change the name from
Shoelaces Inc. to Electronic* s and Silicon
Furth-Burners . In, today's market, the words
'electronics' and 'silicon' are worth 15 times
earnings. However, the real play comes from
the word ' furth-burners , ' which no one under-
stands. A word that no one understands entitles
you to double your entire score. Therefore,
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we have six times earnings for the shoelace
business and 15 times earnings for electronics
and silicon, or a total of 21 times earnings.
Multiply this by two for furth-burners and we
now have a score of k2 times earnings for the
new company.
°
Image, then, is crucial to the value of a firm's stock;
more specifically, 'growth image.' Because Litton and
other conglomerates used their stock as 'money' to purchase
other companies, it was important, then, to maintain this
'growth image' in order to keep the price of their stock
high so that they could buy more assets in exchange for
a reduced amount of their shares. By creating a 'growth
image' a firm could drive up the price of its stock which
gave it additional money to purchase real assets in the
form of another company. Expected value then became real
value which supported the corporations image of continued
growth. This, in turn, increased the value of the corpora-
tions stock, and the cycle was ready to repeat itself.
Fortunately, for conglomerates like Litton Industries,
there were legal ways for them to enhance their growth
image. Traditionally the annual report to stockholders
had been a reasonably dry-reading document. In 1967,
however, Litton incorporated the most up to date adver-
tising and marketing techniques to turn her annual report
into a vehicle that projected the growth image. Further-
more, she used the latest creative accounting methods to
enhance her financial appearance. At the higher levels,
accounting is by no means precise, but the vagueness of
the principles that determine what direction a corporate
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audit will ultimately take has contributed significantly to
a conglomerate's ability to improve its image.
Litton' s 2nd quarter drop in earnings was not the only
setback suffered by her chairman. In early 1968 Noah
Dietrich's libel suit against Thornton came to trial in
Superior Court. After two months of court deliberations,
the jury awarded Dietrich punitive damages of $5 million
against Thornton and $1 million against Litton. Judge
Bayard Rhone, however, set the verdict aside. Dietrich's
lawyer appealed with a 531 page brief accusing the judge
of "unabashed bias and patent prejudice" against his
client. The judge granted a motion for a new trial.
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VI. GROWING UP WITH CONGRESS
The first ships scheduled to be built at Litton 1 s new
yard were eight commercial container vessels for Farrell
Lines and American President Lines. Then, on May 1, 1969,
Litton was awarded a contract to build nine Marine Corps
amphibious assault ships (LHA's) for the Navy. Four days
later Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona criticized the
so-called "civilian-industrial complex." He pointed out
that both Thomas D. Morris, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for procurement, and Alain C. Enthoven, another Assistant
Secretary of Defense, had left their government positions
in January, 19&9 » "t° work at Litton Industries. Both men
held vice presidential positions with Enthoven, the indivi-
dual who systematized the Pentagon's decision making process,
being the vice president for economic planning. What had
been particularly distasteful to the Senator was the fact
that Litton' s defense contracts had increased more than
250 percent from 1967 to 1968. In 196? , Litton, with awards
exceeding $180 million, ranked 36th among defense contrac-
tors. At the end of 1968 Litton was 14-th with contracts
approaching $4-66 million. This increase occurred during
Morris' final year as the supervisor of the Defense Depar-
tment's $4-5 billion procurement program.
Senator William Proxmire , who previously had been cri-
tical of the defense industry's practice of hiring high
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ranking military officers, accused Litton of "buying influ-
ence with the Pentagon and plenty of it." He referred to
Litton' s hiring of Morris as "a payoff for the huge Pentagon
business shifted to Litton in 1968 and as assurance of
immense future influence for Litton." Furthermore, he
noted that as of February, 1969. the top 100 defense con-
tractors employed 2,072 retired military officers' of the
rank of colonel or Navy captain and above; an average of
twenty per company. Litton (with sales of $1.86 billion),
however, had forty-nine or two and a half times the average.
Nevertheless, this was not the highest. The aerospace
firms employed the greatest number of retired high ranking
military officers. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation (with
sales of $2.2 billion) had 210; Boeing Corporation (with
sales of $3.27 billion) had 169; McDonnell Douglas Cor-
poration (with sales of $3.61 billion) had 1^1; General
Dynamics Corporation (with sales of $2.66 billion) had 113;
North American Rockwell Corporation (with sales of $2.64
billion) had 104. Proxmire felt that the defense industry's
practice of hiring high ranking Pentagon officials and
military officers was potentially dangerous to the public
interest. He pointed out that almost 90 percent of all
government contracts were negotiated rather than bid on
competitively.
"In some cases," he said, "former officers may
even negotiate contracts with their former
fellow officers... In addition, there is
subtle or unconscious temptation to the of-
ficer still on active duty. After all, he
can see that over 2,000 of his fellow officers
work for the big companies. How hard a bargain
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does he drive with them when he is one or
two years away from retirment?" 2
Finally, Proxmire stated that, "whether Litton or some other
firm gets a particular contract will he determined very
largely by the subjective attitude of Pentagon officials
3toward Litton officials."^
On June 23, 1970, Litton won the contract to build
thirty DD-963 destroyers for the United States Navy. It
was the largest single peacetime award for shipbuilding
in the history of the Navy. The ship had been scheduled,
like the LHA's, to be built at Ingalls Shipyard's new
facility on the west bank. The destroyers were 560 feet
long, had a 5^ foot beam, and had a displacement of 7000
tons. They were about the size of the Navy's World War II
cruisers. With government furnished radar and weaponry,
the total program cost approached $2.55 billion or approxi-
mately $85 million per ship. The contract price to Litton,
without government furnished equipment, was $2.1 billion.
Due to the sums of money involved, Congress debated the
wisdom of awarding the total 30 ship contract to one yard.
On June 29, 1970, Margaret Chase Smith, the ranking Republi-
can member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, severely
criticized the Navy's decision.
She related to the Senate the earlier correspondence
she had had with the United States President, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy. In her letters
dated April 2k, 1970, to these individuals she had raised
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six points. First, she questioned the last minute con-
tract pricing reset provision that enabled Litton to under-
bid Bath Ironworks of Maine, her homestate, by $270 million
or $9 million per ship. On April 3, 1969, the Navy received
three proposals from Litton, Bath, and General Dynamics to
build the DD-963 destroyer. In September, I969, the Navy
announced that it had dropped General Dynamics from the
competition leaving Litton and Bath. The Navy then issued
two "Requests for Proposal Supplement," one in September,
1969, and the other in January, 1970. The purpose of these
proposal supplements was to place the ship designs of the
two remaining companies on a relatively comparable basis
and to bring the prices of each down from their April, 1969.
estimates. By February, 1970, the two companies had re-
submitted their third proposal to the Navy. Each, accord-
ing to Senator Smith, had met the Navy's technical require-
ments, and each had approximately the same price. Then,
on March 20, 1970, the Navy asked each firm to submit a
fourth prposal; their "best and final" offer. No technical
or specification changes were requested, instead, the Navy
asked that the new proposals be on the basis of a new type
of contract. The change was to be from a "Fixed Price
Incentive" contract to a "Fixed Price Incentive Successive
Targets" contract (FPIS) . The difference was that a firm
fixed price or a new target price could be specified in the
thirty-ninth month after the contract award date. Further-
more, the share line had been changed from a 70/30 ratio
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to a 85/15 ratio, and the ceiling price had been raised
to 130 percent of target cost from 125 percent of target
cost /""See Appendix C_7 The ultimate result of these
changes was that Litton underbid Bath by a substantial
$270 million on the fourth proposal.
Second, she questioned the rationale of awarding a
$2 billion contract to a company that already had the
largest shipbuilding backlog in the industry (Litton had
the LHA plus submarine and merchant ship contracts). .She
also noted that Litton' s new yard was inexperienced at
handling a large and diversified backlog of ships.
Third, she questioned the wisdom of placing such a
large award with one contractor from the viewpoint of
national security. If the company failed to produce, the
impact upon the Navy throughout the 1970's would be immense.
Fourth, the contract, based upon McNamara's multi-year
total-package-procurement concept, would take control
away from Congress because of the provision for large
cancellation fees should all or part of the program be
terminated.
Fifth, the award of this contract to a yard that already
had modernized because of prior total package awards would
jeopardize the existance of an already weakened competitive
base for future destroyer construction. The ultimate result
could be more expensive destroyers in the long run.
Sixth, the leaks of vital bidding information prior to
contract award had violated public law and had underminded
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the competitive process through which the DD-963 had under-
gone. Senator Smith related how personnel of shipping lines,
for whom Litton has built, or was building merchant ships,
told a member of congress on a golf course two months prior
to the DD-963 contract award, that Litton had underbid
Bath by $270 million.
On August 18, 1970, Senator Smith again addressed the
Senate. She reiterated the points in her June 29th speech
and presented the President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel
Report of July 1, 1970 in support of her position. She
claimed that the report, prepared under the cognizance of
the Comptroller of Defense, Wilfred J. McNeil, added strength
to her argument. The report, among other things, presented
five areas of concern.
First, if the Navy implements its concepts of series
production in a single yard for major ship procurement
programs, the long term result would be the concentration
of major Navy shipbuilding programs in three yards; Newport
News, Litton, and Electric Boat. Not only would the remaining
shipyards lose their capability to produce because of a
lack of utilization, but the existence of the big three
could also be jeopardized because of the risks inherent
in large package ship procurement programs. For example,
the thirty ship DD-963 program represents about $3 billion;
a ten percent loss, or $300 million, exceeds the net worth




Second, as concentration of shipbuilding continues,
the competitive base will decline, thereby offsetting
the economic advantages gained through series production.
Third, in order to maintain an adequate production base
for its warships, and in order to generate competition within
this base, the Navy should divide its large multi-ship
awards among two or more yards
.
Fourth, to provide healthy competition and to main-
tain an adequate production base, the Navy should distri-
bute its prime series production contracts of one class
of ship to more than one yard if the quantity is greater
than ten ships.
Fifth, by now the Navy could have had a DD-963 proto-
type ready to sail for less money than they have already
put out for paper.
On August 20, 1970, Senator Smith made still another
presentation to the Senate. This time, however, she used
the term "buy-in" to describe the reason for Litton 1 s
drastic reduction in price on the fourth proposal. Further-
more, Mrs. Smith challenged the credibility of Rear Admiral
Nathan Sonenshein, commander of the Naval Ship Systems
Command. On May 18, 1970, the admiral sent a confidential
memorandum to the chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee. In it he said that it would cost the Navy an
extra $225 million to split the DD-963 award among two
yards. However, the same admiral told the news media a
few weeks later that the extra cost to the Navy would be
75

$600 million if the award were split. Both figures were
reported on page 30 of the July k, 1970 issue of Business
Week in its Washington Outlook section. The magazine referred
to the $600 million as a "scare figure," while Senator
Smith questioned the credibility of the confidential
classification on the memorandum containing the $225
million estimate if that same figure had been supplied
to Business Week with no classification restrictions.
Business Week further interpreted the publicly announced
$600 million figure as being the Navy's attempt to frighten
the Congress out of splitting the award legislatively.
On August 26, 1976, Senator Smith explained in detail
the sixth point in her April 2^th letter concerning leaks
of information prior to the DD-963 contract award. She
said that she wrote a letter to the Attorney General on
July 1, 1970. In the letter she mentioned that James L.
Goodrich, the president of Bath Iron Works, was her source
of information, and that Representative William D. Hathaway,
the Congressman from the Second Congressional District
of Maine, was the individual who was told at the Congressional
Golf and Country Club by personnel of shipping lines, for
whom Litton had built, or was building merchant ships,
that Litton had underbid Bath by $9 million per ship or
$270 million total. The response to her July 1st letter
took ^4-1 days and was inconclusive. Mrs. Smith told the
Senate that she had been "brushed-off ," and that the Criminal
76

Division of the Department of Justice had failed to con-
tact either James L. Goodrich or Representative Hathaway
concerning the alleged disclosures. She went on, saying
that Bath officials reported to the Secretary of the Navy
that they believed their February 2, 1970 proposal price had
been known in the industry prior to March 26, 1970 or three
months before the contract award. The significance, accord-
ing to Mrs. Smith, was that Litton knew ahead of time what
Bath's bid had been and therefore was able to underbid by
a substantial amount on the final round knowing that she
would be able to recoup the cost at the thirty-ninth month
because of the new reset provision.
On August 27. 1970, Mrs. Smith had a Government Account-
ing Office report printed in the Congressional Record. The
report had been the result of Mrs. Smith's July 1, 1970
letter to the GAO requesting that they conduct an investi-
gation into the circumstances surrounding the $2.1 billion
DD-963 award to Litton Industries, Inc. The GAO reported
that the destroyer contract was a multi-year fixed-price
incentive, successive target (FPIS) contract. The initial
target price had been $1.7892 billion, which consisted of
an initial target cost of $1. 6^607 billion and an initial
target profit of $1^3.13 million. The price could be
revised within 90 days after the end of the 37th month
after the contract date. Under no circumstances, however,
could the re-set price exceed an established price ceiling
of 130 percent of the initial target cost or $2.1399 billion
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Furthermore, the GAO document supported the views of Senator
Smith. The report concluded:
While some consideration may have been
given alternative methods of procuring these
ships, we saw no evidence that the Navy
performed a thorough analysis of alternatives
to awarding a contract of this magnitude to
one supplier or of the potential consequences
of this action. Whether or not it would have
"been to the government's advantage to have these
destroyers constructed in more than one yard
does not appear to have been considered at
that time and we have no firm data from which
to assess that question.
Furthermore
:
Notwithstanding these efforts, the Navy's
past experience over the years gives little
encouragement that these destroyers really
will be built to a single configuration.
The report went on:
The Navy's objective is to build a single
ship that will substantially reduce logistical
and other problems that have plagued the Navy
over the years. In the last analysis, this
objective appears to have been the overriding
and compelling consideration by the Navy
throughout this whole procurement, and has
been the primary reason for adhering to
the concept of an award to a single con-
tractor.
We think that the substance of the Navy's
rationale comes down to the desire to solve
what are long standing problems by a stan-
dardized ship and to reduce the cost of
acquisition as well as operations. However,
by contracting with one company the risk
is present that the company may not be able
to complete the contract at the agreed price
.
It is possible that the company at some point
could come to the Navy and say it is unable
to build the ship for the contract price.
Under these circumstances, the Navy would
find itself with few options. The Navy says
it does not expect that this is a real




We "believe also that there is some danger
to future competition. Given the Navy's premise
of a single ship design (presumably Litton* s)
at the lowest price, it is difficult to see
how another company will be able to compete
pricewise with Litton on future orders. Start-
up and early learning costs in such a program
are substantial and, assuming the same ground
rules are aplied in the future, it seems ques-
tionable as to whether anyone will be able to
compete with the successful contractor in
this award, no matter how many additional
ships the Navy plans to buy. We are told
that the differences in commercial and
military ships, even if the Maritime pro-
gram should become a reality, would not make
the winner of these awards competitive for
military ships.
On August 28, 1970, Senator John Stennis of Mississippi,
defended the award of the 30 destroyer DD-963 contract to
one shipyard. He refuted the points presented in Senator
Smith's argument, and he gave emphasis to the correctness
of awarding the contract to one yard. In his conclusion,
Mr. Stennis said that the Congress would be setting a poor
precedent if it repudiated a contract that had already been
awarded to a private firm by the Navy.. He pointed out that
the shipbuilding companies had been competing for the DD-963
since 1967 , and that the ground rules for the contest stipu-
lated that the winner would build all thirty ships. Essen-
tially Mr. Stennis was comparing the DD-963 competition
to a sporting event where one team had already won the
game, but the officials decided to change the rules after
the game had been played thereby disallowing the victory
and forcing the winner to compete again under the new rules.
Senator Stennis' position was in response to Mrs. Smith's
action on the Senate floor and also to Amendment 811 that
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had not yet been introduced by Senator Edmund Muskie , also
from the state of Maine. The amendment would have required
the DD-963 contract to have been divided among two domestic
shipbuilders with the total number of destroyers being
constructed at each yard approximately equal.
On August 31 f 1970, Senator Muskie introduced a modi-
fied version of Amendment 811 which stipulated that the
prime contractor would have to subcontract a substantially
equal number of destroyers to another shipyard. Again
Senator Stennis, this time supported by Senator Eastland
of Mississippi, argued against such an amendment. Adding
to his previous argument, he pointed out that the Congress
had already turned down an amendment to have the DD-963
contract split. He was referring to the amendment proposed
by Representative Louis C. Wyman, Republican of New Hampshire.
If Wyman' s amendment had passed, it would have required the
construction of the thirty DD-963 destroyers in more than
one shipyard. On April 30, 1970, the House of Representatives
approved the amendment, but the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee, working in closed session, voted to strike the
amendment from the $20.2 billion defense procurement author-
ization bill. Interesting enough, Senator Stennis was the
chairman of that committee
.
In the end, Senator Muskie ' s amendment did not pass,
but all of the breaks did not go in Litton' s direction
either. In November, 1970, the Court of Appeals said that
Judge Bayard Rhone had erred in overturning the jury's
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decision in the Noah Dietrich libel case. The court or-
dered a new trial.
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VII. CONGRESS CROSSES THE RIVER
On January 20, 1971. the Navy sent a letter to Litton
Industries in which the company was informed that the Navy
was planning to cut back its LHA program from nine ships to
five. According to the Navy, there were two reasons for the
cutback. First, the LHA program was compressed because of
the overall reduction in the size of the United States mili-
tary forces brought about by the gradual American with-
drawal from Vietnam. Second, the Navy felt a growing need
to acquire more destroyers, frigates, and attack submarines,
rather than amphibian assault ships, to counter the expand-
ing Soviet surface and submarine fleets. A third reason,
though speculative, was that the Navy had become, in the
words of one person at the Federal Maritime Commission,
"very concerned and frightened" about the problems that
had been developing at the shipyard in Pascagoula. In the
fall of 1969, Hurricane Camille struck the Gulf Coast caus-
ing significant damage to the Ingalls Shipbuilding Company.
No lives had been lost, but roofs had been blown off numer-
ous buildings, a 270-foot gantry crane had been toppled,
and a 602-foot ship had been wrenched loose from its moor-
ings and blown across the Pascagoula River where it had
become mired in soft mud. The hurricane plus management
mistakes and very acute startup problems were causing pro-
duction delays and increased shipbuilding costs at the new
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yard. Because of cancellation clauses in the LHA contract,
Harry J. Gray, the senior executive vice president of Litton
Industries, said that the Navy could be paying Litton at
least $109.7 million for the termination of the four ships.
This figure was confirmed when President Nixon sent his
fiscal 1972 budget to Congress and requested $109.7 million
to cover the cost of early contract termination.
In September, 1971. Ingalls shipyard suffered a strike
which caused even further delays. During the same month,
Litton announced that Fred W. 0' Green would replace Harry
J. Gray as Head of the corporation's defense and marine
products group which included Ingalls Shipbuilding Company.
The following month, Margaret Chase Smith submitted
to the Senate a summary report by the Federal Maritime Com-
mission on Ingalls Shipbuilding. The report highlighted
the circumstances surrounding the launching of the first
commercial containership for Farrell Lines. On October 3»
1968, Litton contracted to build eight such ships; four
for Farrell Lines and four for American President Lines.
These were the first ships scheduled to be built at Litton'
s
new automated shipyard on the West Bank. The ships for Far-
rell Lines were about fourteen months behind schedule on
the average. The total lost time had been 1,702 days,
and the contract specified that Litton would be charged
$3,000 for each day of delay. The first ship for Farrell
Lines was launched on June 26, 1971. and was scheduled for
delivery on March 1, 1972. According to the contract, it
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was supposed to be delivered on December 22, 1970. Three
weeks after it had been launched, its superstructure sagged
about half an inch. Furthermore, transverse bulkheads were
out of alignment and shell frames were not evenly lined up
with the floor. Farrell's officials were concerned about
both the delays and poor construction. The four ships for
American President Lines, on the other hand, were moved to
the old yard on the East Bank when it was determined that
they could not be built at the new facility. Knowledgeable
people felt that Litton could lose $50 million on the eight
containerships . The Navy was also concerned about Litton'
s
shipbuilding operation because the LHA program was one year
behind schedule
.
In December, 1971. Congressman Burke of Massachusetts
also had something to say about Ingalls Shipbuilding. The
Fore River Shipyard in Quincy, Massachusetts was located in
Mr. Burke's district. The congressman was not happy because
the Fore River Shipyard was suffering from a lack of orders
while Ingalls had a $3 billion backlog in government con-
tracts. He presented an article from the December 9. 1971
issue of the Wall Street Journal entitled "Shipbuilding Set-
backs—Delays, Problems at a New Shipyard Raises Fears that
Navy's Fleet Modernization May be Delayed." The article
reiterated the problems Ingalls had with the Austral Envoy
(the first containership for Farrell Lines). The problems
were a result of management turnover, manpower shortages,
late deliveries, and shoddy workmanship. If these causes
should continue, serious financial and technical problems
8^

could hamper the Navy's two huge shipbuilding programs.
Both the Navy and Litton maintained, however, that the
startup problems encountered with the Austral Envoy were
mostly being overcome. Even though, the then current
price tag for the DD-963 destroyer program was $2.71
billion including government furnished equipment. That
came to $90.5 million apiece. It was speculated that the
cost would be driven up even further because of an esca-
lation clause in the contract that covered the rising
cost of materials and labor. Late delivery would also
push the price higher.
On January 11, 1972, The New York Times reported that
Congressman Les Aspin of Wisconsin charged the Navy with
giving Litton a $3-million gift by changing the original
delivery dates for the five landing helicopter assault
ships. According to Aspin, the original delivery dates
were scratched out and replaced with new dates that were
twelve to fourteen months later than specified in the ori-
ginal contract. Because the LHA program was about one year
behind, the Navy could have received $600,000 for each of
the five ships.
On March 27 , 1972, government auditors told the Sub-
committee on Priorities and Economy of the Joint Economic
Committee that Litton Industries had charged the Navy,
from 1968 to 1971, $7 million for work that had been done
on commercial ships in the same yard.
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Shortly thereafter, the Wall Street Journal reported,
on April 14, 1972, that the House Armed Services Committee
had announced that it was going to investigate Litton*
s
handling of the LHA and DD-963 programs. In a related
matter, the newspaper reported that the Secretary of the
Navy, John Chaffee, had rejected a Litton request to revise
the LHA contract. The LHA program was at least eighteen
months behind schedule
.
On April 17, 1972, the first day of the closed hearings,
Congressman Aspin addressed the full House. He announced
that he had asked the GAO to investigate Litton 1 s claim for
$^-55 million in inflation charges on the DD-963 program.
The Navy's estimate was for $310 million or a difference of
$145 million between the Navy and Litton. According to
Litton, the price for the destroyer program had risen to
$2,244.2 million from the original contract price of $1,789.2
million.
Aspin also talked about the LHA program. The original
contract called for nine ships at a program unit cost of
$153.4 million. The total program cost came to $1,380.3
million. When the Navy cut the number of ships to five
the total program cost dropped to $960 million, but the cost
per ship rose to $192 million. Congress had already appro-
priated $9^1.7 million, including the $109.7 million cancel-
lation fee, for the LHA program which meant it would have
to appropriate approximately $19 million more to cover the
estimated $960 million. Furthermore, Litton had informed
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the Navy that it expected to reach ceiling on the LHA pro-
gram which meant an additional $10^ million had to be added
to the $960 million. All totalled, Congress would have to
appropriate an additional $123 million. Also, according
to Admiral Kidd, the Chief of Naval Material Command, the
first LHA would "be nineteen months late. Other reports
speculated that the fifth LHA would he two years late
.
Finally, Aspin attributed the shipyard's woes to startup,
labor, and production problems. The yard had had difficulty
in recruiting and retaining skilled labor and managerial
personnel. The labor turnover rate at the West bank yard
had been twice that of the East bank facility, and had
been as high as fifty percent a year. Furthermore, some
commercial ships and LHA's had been moved to the East bank
where they would be constructed in the traditional manner.
In closing, Congressman Aspin criticized the Navy for
sinking $3 billion during a thirteen month period into a
new and untested shipbuilding facility.
On May 23, 1972, Litton Industries reported a fiscal
1972 third quarter loss of $1^.2 million, This was attri-
buted to the company's shipbuilding operations which suf-
fered a pretax write-off of $25-^ million. The write-off
was due to setbacks on the LHA program and on the eight
containerships
.
In June, 1972, Litton announced that it would pay $5>5
million in claims to Farrell Lines and American President





On July 26, 1972, Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin
made public a Navy letter to Litton dated June 23, 1972.
The letter expressed concern about Litton* s ability to
complete the contract for the five amphibious assault
ships. The letter also criticized Litton' s proposal of
March 31, 1972, in which the company requested a $270
million increase in price for the five ships plus a $109.7
million cancellation fee, the maximum provided for in the
contract, for terminating four of them. Furthermore, the
Navy's letter was critical of Litton' s proposed revision
to the LKA delivery schedule. The Navy claimed that Litton*
s
revision would result in the first LEA being nineteen and
a half months late while the fifth LKA could be as much
as twenty-six months late. These delays, according to
the Navy, could drastically effect the delivery of the fol-
lowing thirty DD-963 class destroyers.
Nevertheless, on August 31, 1972, the Navy announced
that it would accept a major revision to the LHA contract.
Originally, the Navy was to have paid Litton the costs
incurred on the LHA program until September 1, 1972. From
that date, the Navy was to have paid Litton based on the
percentage of work completed. However the Navy had decided
to pay Litton* s costs until February 28, 1973- At the
same time, John H. Warner, Secretary of the Navy, rejected
Litton' s claim for $379 million. He said that the claim
had been unsubstantiated. Les Aspin, on the other hand,






On November 28, 1972, President Nixon announced the
appointment of Roy L. Ash as the director of the White
House Office of Management and Budget. Previously, Ash
had headed the President's Advisory Council on Executive
Organization. Ash said that he would sell his Litton stock,
about 200,000 shares, and place the proceeds, about $2.5
million, in a blind trust. Furthermore, he would sever
his connections with the company by December 9. 1972. Fred
W. 0'Green replaced Ash as president of Litton Industries.
Ash took over his new duties on December 11, 1972.
On December 18, 1972, the Subcommittee on Priorities
and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee
opened hearings to discuss cost overruns on major defense
contracts. The subcommittee was headed by Senator William
Proxmire . On the first day of the hearings Elmer Staats,
head of the GA0, reported that the LHA program had serious
problems. He told the committee that the original ceiling
price for nine LHA's had been $1.19 billion or $133 million
per ship. If Litton had its way, the cost could exceed
$200 million per ship. Staats also estimated that the first
LHA would be 23-| months late while the last one could be
32i months late
.
On the second day of the hearings, the committee heard
from Gordon Rule, Director of the Procurement Control and
Clearance Division of the Navy Material Command. He was very
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critical of Ash's appointment as the director of the Office
of Management and Budget:
"Well," said Rule, "I think first, that old
General Eisenhower must be twitching in his
grave
. He was the one who first called at-
tention to the so-called military-industrial
complex, and I frankly think we have added
a new dimension. . . .1 think it is almost a
military-industrial-executive department
complex. I think it is a mistake for the
President to nominate Mr. Ash, whom I have
never met. I think it is a worse mistake
for him to accept the job."l
Furthermore, Rule said that the free enterprise system
had broken down in the area of giant defense contracts.
Major contracting has become a "quasi -we Ifare industry"
with the Government rescuing large companies from bank-
ruptcy while allowing smaller firms to go out of business.
The situation was being aggravated as top executives of the
large contracting corporations went to work for the Federal
Government. Rule was also unhappy about competitive bidding
on large Government contracts. The procedure encourages
contractors to reduce their prices at the last minute in
an attempt to "buy- in" on the contract. In such cases
where the drop in price was an obvious "buy-in," Rule
recommended that an additional clause be placed in the
contract stipulating that the company would be responsible
for the first $500 million if financial difficulties developed
Rule stated, furthermore, that "modular construction" was
not suitable for building 9 large complex warship such




On the day following his testimony before the sub-
committee, Gordon Rule, sick in bed with laryngitis, was
visited by Admiral Kidd. The Admiral handed him a letter
of retirement and demanded his signature by the end of the
day. Rule refused. Two days later he was transferred to
the Anacostia Naval Air Station where he was assigned con-
sulting duties at the Logistics Management "School. The
Civil Service Commission could do nothing for Rule because
the transfer was technically a temporary reassignment rather
than a disciplinary demotion. Rule's only alternative was
to file a grievance, but this would have done little good
because John Warner, who was in on the decision to transfer
him, would have made the final decision.
The Rule affair was remarkably similar to action that
had been taken against A. Ernest Fitzgerald who had been
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force. Fitzgerald
had been transferred to Thailand to examine a bowling alley
project after he criticized the cost overruns on the Air
Forces C-5A program. According to Title 18 of the United
Stated States Code, the penalty for intimidating witnesses
before a Congressional committee was five years in jail and
a $5,000 fine
.
Senator Proxmire went to Rule's defense:
After Rule gave his headline -making testimony
criticizing Ash, Grumman and Litton, and the Navy
moved against him, Proxmire invited Rule and Kidd
to appear before his subcommittee together. Kidd
declined, citing the prospect of Civil Service
Commission proceedings on the matter as his rea-
son. But the commission's general counsel decided
that Rule's assignment to the training school
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could not be classified an "adverse action"
and said the commission could not act on
it. This left Kidd without his excuse.
The result was a spectacular confrontation
on January 10 with Rule and Kidd seated side-
by-side at the witness table before the irate
Proxmire
. The Senator began by denouncing
the Navy's action against Rule as "the har-
assment of an able, dedicated and courageous
public servant..." "The significance of
this episode," he said, "goes far beyond
the issue of shabby, unjust treatment of
one outstanding employee. It goes to the
very heart of the legislative process and
the ability of the Congress to obtain infor-
mation on the activities of the executive
branch." Proxmire reminded Kidd that Fed-
eral law prohibited the obstruction of
Congressional inquiry and noted that
Richard Nixon, while a Senator, had once
introduced legislation making it a Federal
crime to intimidate public employees from
testifying before Congress.
Ironically, when Richard M. Nixon was a Senator from Cali-
fornia, he said:
Unless protection is given to witnesses
who are members of the armed services or
employees of the Government, the scheduled
hearings will amount to no more than a parade
of yes-men for administration policies as they
exist. 2
Kidd, understandably, was on the defen-
sive. He found himself acknowledging on the
one hand that Rule "was probably the most
competent gentlemen we had in matters of
procurement," but insisting on the other that
he had lost confidence in him because of his
alleged loose attitude toward news leaks and
his inability to abide by instructions as to
what to say before Proxmire ' s subcommittee.
But Kidd insisted he wasn't trying to withhold
information from Congress. And despite his
declining confidence in Rule, and the fact
that Rule had been sent on an obviously tri-
vial mission, Kidd maintained that he had not
disciplined him. Flip-flopping again, Kidd
insisted that Rule's comments before the
subcommittee had damaged the negotiations
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with Grumman and Litton. Both Proxmire and
Rule had a field day with these tangled explana-
tions. How, demanded Proxmire, had Rule's
remarks hurt the negotiations? "That would
be a bit difficult to measure and quantify,"
replied Kidd. "In other .words ," said the
Senator, "The Navy considered any discussion
of Litton or Grumman taboo." "That is what
I told him, Mr. Proxmire, yes, sir," answered
Kidd. Rule broke in at one point to charge
that since the rejection of the Avondale
claim, the Navy had systematically been
reducing his influence. "I know what is
going on," he said. "And I know that Admiral
Kidd probably thinks I am a burr up and
he wants me out." When Kidd recalled how
he had been told that Litton, Grumman, and
Rule would be his three major problems,
Rule replied. "I hope he is not as screwed
up in the negotiations with Litton and
Grumman as he is with Rule." At another
point, Rule said of Kidd, "This man has
been in procurement 12 months, 13 months.
All of a sudden he is an instant expert."
What, Proxmire asked, was Kidd's response
to that? "He is right," said Kidd, "he is
right. I have no corner on the market on
brains . "^
Later, Rule told a reporter that the Navy was at a
disadvantage at the negotiating table, because its represent-
atives were so unexperienced when compared to those of the
large contracting firms such as Litton and Grumman. Rule
went on, saying there were two principal reasons why con-
tractors submitted unrealistically low bids. First, in the
Government's competitive bidding process, it is a good way
to win a contract (buy-in) . Second, there is pressure in
the system to keep the bids artifically low so that the
military programs will appear less costly to Congress.
Once a large sum of money has been sunk into a program,
military and DOD civilian managers know it is easier to get
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more money to keep it going. Furthermore, Rule believed
that everyone in a position to influence these matters
stood to gain from large military expenditures. Once he
made a list of all the people who could influence military
spending. He could classify these people into ten groups
ranging from Congressmen, to the military, to the con-
tractors, to the labor unions. "Everyone involved wants
something," he noted. "When all these turn on their respec-
tive powers, where does that leave the taxpayer?"
In March, 1973 > Gordon Rule was reinstated as the Navy's




After President Nixon announced Ash's appointment,
Emmett Steele's lawsuit was settled out of court for $2.^
million. The award went to Steele's posthumous estate
(Steele died in 1972) . When asked the reason for the
settlement, Ash replied that the jury would not judge
the case on its merits, but rather, on the emotional
aspect projected by a widow and her fatherless children.
On February 5i 1973. the Senate voted overwhelmingly
to require the confirmation of Roy Ash as Director of the
Office of Management and Budget. The vote followed a
vigorous debate on two major issues. The primary issue
was eloquently articulated by Senator Sam Ervin:
"The O.M.B. director is the second most powerful of-
ficial in the Federal Government and it is essential that
he be subject to the thorough scrutiny of the Senate."
The secondary issue, and the motive for a minority of
the bill's sponsors, was the desire to have Roy L. Ash
undergo a Senate interrogation so that his background
could be examined.
During the debate, Senator Humphrey said the Nixon
Administration equated budget-making with policy-making,
and that the 197^ budget had been the result of a year's
secret planning by the Office of Management and Budget.
It was the secrecy surrounding the planning of the Federal
budget that made a mockery of democracy, according to
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Humphrey, because there had been no room for public or
congressional participation. The Federal budget represented
more than one-fourth of the Nation's GNP. Furthermore,
Humphrey believed that the President was attempting to
increase the power of the Office of Management and Budget
2
at the expense of Congress.
Previously, Senator Proxmire had criticized Litton for
the mismanagement of Navy contracts while Ash had been
president. Conflict of interest, according to Proxmire,
was a real possibility with Ash as the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget. The Senator also noted
Ash's previous activities at Hughes Aircraft and the cir-
cumstances surrounding Emmett Steele's law suit.
In February and March, 1973. the news media disclosed
that Litton had set up a $2 million cash pool for its top
twenty-five executives on June 29, 1972--a few weeks after
Litton informed the Navy that cash flow problems would
develop if the LHA progress payments were stopped. By
September, 1972, almost $600,000 had been loaned at four
percent interest, including $165,000 to Fred W. 'Green.
On March 1, 1973, the Navy announced that it would
pay Litton only $9^6 million for the five LHA ' s . Litton
denounced the unilateral decision, claiming that she should
receive $1,056 billion. The original target price for nine
LHA's was $1.01 billion. Furthermore, the Navy gave Litton
ninety days to pay back $55 million in previously advanced
payments which the company had not yet earned due to
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construction delays. The $55 million overpayment became
visible when payments for the LHA program were switched
from a cost basis to a progress basis on March 1, 1973'
As a way to recoup the money, the Navy decided to halt
its payments to Litton, which amounted to more than $3
million each week. If, at the end of three months, the
$55 million had not been paid, then Litton would have to
refund the rest. Litton, however, obtained a restraining
order from the United States Federal District Court in
Biloxi, Mississippi, which prevented the Navy from dis-
continuing the weekly payments. In June, 1973 1 "the Justice
Department asked the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, in New Orleans, to stay the court order
requiring the Navy to continue the weekly payments to
Litton. In October, 1973. the stay was granted and the
Navy stopped making the weekly payments.
One month later, on November 10, 1973. "the first
DD-963 class destroyer was launched; six months ahead
of schedule
.
In January, 197^, the United States Court of Appeals
in New Orleans said that the United States Federal District
Court in Biloxi, Mississippi, did not have the jurisdiction
to grant the injunction requiring the Navy to continue the




In March, 197^, Noah Dietrich was awarded $100,000
in compensatory damages in the retrial of his libel suit
against Tex Thornton and Litton Industries. The jury had
decided against awarding punitive damages.
By April 2k t 197^, Litton had asked for a $350 million
increase on the DD-963 program. This had raised the price
to $2.1^ billion from the original target price of $1.7892
billion. Litton had claimed that this was not a cost over-
run, because the original ceiling price of $2.1^ billion had
not been exceeded. Instead this had been the one-time price
adjustment allowed for in the contract. Furthermore, Litton
was expecting additional costs of $^-85 million to cover the
rising cost of materials on the destroyer program. In
addition, some of the destroyers could be delivered as
much as five months late
.
By August, 197^. Congressman Aspin had been told by
Navy officials that the last of the destroyers could be
delivered as much as eighteen months late. Furthermore,
the LHA program, which had already been two to three years
behind schedule, had been delayed an additional year, and
the cost of each ship had risen to $228.2 million from
the original $153 million.
On November 17, 197^, a 75-member machinists' union
unit posted pickets at the Ingalls Shipyard. By December
there were 1^,000 workers on strike. The strike was eco-
nomically motivated and lasted until December 16, 197^-
The strike ended with the signing of a thirty-seven month
contract that provided for a twenty-four percent wage
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increase. Furthermore, an employees 1 cost-of-living
clause had been included in the contract for the first
time
.
On April 21, 1975. Litton disclosed that it had increased
its LHA claims by an additional $130 million, bringing
total claims on the five ship program to $50^,8^7,000.
Litton said the increase had been due to construction
delays and the extraordinary rate of inflation since March,
1972, when the original claim for approximately $380 mil-
lion had been submitted. The assault ships were two to
four years behind schedule
.
In April, 1976, the Defense Department decided to
settle its shipbuilding claims by resorting to a special
law that allowed the Secretary of Defense to unilaterally
modify defense contracts in the interest of national secur-
ity. The claims, approximately $1.9 billion, involved
eleven contracts and four shipbuilding companies. The
Pentagon estimated the claims could be settled for $700
million, but the money would have to be appropriated by
Congress. In June, after two months of negotiations,
the Pentagon announced that its plan had failed. Two of
the companies, Ingalls Shipbuilding and Newport News, did
not accept the Pentagon's proposal.
Personnel on the Business Review Staff at the Navy's
contract administration office in Pascagoula shed further
light on Litton' s shipbuilding operation. The new ship-
yard on the West bank had been designed and originally
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administered by aerospace personnel from Culver City,
California. These people knew little about shipbuilding.
The new yard had been designed to be operated by unskilled
workers. Consequently, the aerospace managers who originally
administered the new yard resisted hiring skilled workers
from the east bank yard because of the original design
intent and because the new managers believed it would be
difficult to teach these workers new methods. Furthermore,
the designers overestimated the availability of ship
construction workers. Building a stable labor force has
been, interestingly enough, an industry wide problem. Ship
construction is not pleasant from the laborer's point of
view. It requires long hours of hot and heavy work. At
Ingalls the situation has been aggravated by the hot climate.
Before the west bank yard had been built, the east bank
employed about 9,000 people. Today, total employment at
Ingalls is between 23,000 and 25,000 people. This kind
of growth attracts non-skilled, transient workers who want
to become wealthy in a hurry. When they discover that
they are not going to become rich overnight, they either
quit or are terminated for poor attendance. The current
labor turnover rate at Ingalls is five percent a month.
When the west bank's method of modular construction
developed serious problems, Litton put Ned Marandino in
charge of both yards at Ingalls in July 1972. Marandino,
who had previously headed the old east bank yard, replaced
most of the west bank yard's aerospace management personnel
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with top and middle management people from the east "bank
yard. He also transferred skilled workers from the east
bank to the west bank. Marandino 1 s plan was to combine the
two yards under one management and to build the Navy's ships
in the traditional manner. Under the new plan the ships
were to be constructed on the west bank. They would be
launched, when they were forty to sixty percent complete,
and floated across the Pascagoula river to the outfitting
piers on the east bank. It was discovered, however, that
the west bank yard could produce ships faster than the
east bank yard could outfit them. This caused bottlenecks
which forced the company to revert back to the modular
method of construction on the west bank. Under the modular
method, ships were launched when they were seventy to seventy
-
five percent complete. To reduce congestion further, the
company has been using both the east and west bank piers
for outfitting.
Nevertheless, traditional shipbuilding methods had
been used to construct the first LEA and the first and
second DD-963 class destroyers. The original estimate of
production manhours required to build these ships had been
based on the premise that the company would use the modular
method of construction which required less production
labor than the traditional method. Thus, the company
had underestimated the production manhours required. The
company has admitted that they had been overoptimistic in
their production manhour estimates. Litton* s underestimation
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of labor required plus her overestimation of labor avail-
able has placed her in a very tenuous position.
One of the most significant reasons why Litton has
been projecting a loss on the LEA program has been the
extraordinary rate of inflation over the past few years.
Escalation clauses have provided relief up to the delivery
dates specified in the original contract. Escalation pay-
ments have been paid separately up to the original delivery
dates, however, escalation payments have not been paid
after those dates. This has placed the company in a very
precarious position, because the first LHA is two to three
years behind schedule, and the last LKA is five years late.
At least one person on the Business Review Staff expressed
an opinion that escalation clauses should provide for
payments up to the actual delivery date.
An outsider leaves the Business Review Office with the
impression that Litton is now performing adequately on the
Navy's shipbuilding programs. The one major drawback,
however, has been the LHA . The assault ship is too big
and too complex for modular construction. Furthermore,
there are only five of them; hardly enough to take advantage
of the learning curve. The DD-963 destroyer, on the other
hand, appears to be suited for the modular method of con-
struction. It is considerably smaller than the LHA, and
there are more of them.
At least one individual on the Business Review Staff
is not optimistic about the concept of total package pro-
curement of Navy ships . The awarding of one shipbuilding
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contract, where the development and production portions
have been separated by a reset provision, has not worked
out too well for the Navy. Past experience hints that two
separate contracts, one for development and one for pro-
duction, will be written in the future
.
There is no doubt that Litton had been too optimistic
and had underestimated the startup costs for the new yard,
however, one should not forget that it was a new yard
,
and that Litton has been a pioneer in the American Ship-
building industry. One person on the Business Review
Staff was doubtful that any other organization could have
done better than Litton. Furthermore, the Navy's ships
would have been more expensive had they been built in a
Naval Shipyard.
A conversation with Commander Ray Harbrecht, commanding
officer of the U.S.S. Spruance (DD-963) , revealed that the
first DD-963 destroyer has outperformed all specifications.
Commander Harbrecht has been very pleased with the performance
of the U.S.S. Spruance on its six month shakedown cruise.
He was also impressed with the performance of Ingalls Ship-
yard on the 2-month post shakedown availability (PSA)
.
The following is a letter from Commander Harbrecht to Leonard






FPO NEW YORK, N.Y., MAY 21, 1976
Dear Mr. Erb: USS Spruance completed her post shakedown
availability on 21 May, 1976. During my nineteen years
in the Navy, having served in eight different ships, I
can say without equivocation that the PSA was the most
productive shipyard availability I have observed. The
timely completion of over 800 jobs was made possible only
by the concerted efforts of all personnel working on
board. The interest in the ship, willingness to work
with the Spruance crew, care exhibited in workmanship,
and efforts to keep the ship clean were exceptional.
Please convey to the employees of Ingalls Shipbuilding
our sincere appreciation for a magnificant job.
Ray Harbrecht
Commander, USN.
On June 29, 1976, Fred W. O'Green, president of Litton
Industries, announced that Ingalls would stop work on the
LHA program on August 1, 1976, if a financial settlement
had not been reached by that date. William Clements,
Deputy Secretary of Defense, maintained, however, that
Litton would complete the contract, and the Navy would get
its ships.
The final chapter on Litton-Ingalls Shipbuilding may
not be written for many years. In the meantime, however,
it appears that the courts will have to address some very
penetrating questions such as: Who will ultimately pay for
the mistakes committed and the dollars spent? Who will
benefit from the knowledge gained and the products pro-
duced? Will it be the 150,000 Litton stockholders or will
it be the 220 million American taxpayers? The answers to
10^

these questions may have far reaching consequences for




CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF KEY DATES
1910 : Ingalls Industries founded in Birmingham, Alabama.
1913: Charles Bates Thornton's birth in Haskell, Texas.
1918: Roy L. Ash's birth.
193^: Thornton goes to work at Department of Interior.
1936: America's first all-welded tanker built by Ingalls.
1937s Thornton receives Bachelor of Commercial Science
Degree
.
1938: Ingalls bids on four C3 cargo ships.
19^1: Tex joins the Army.
19^7: Ash graduates from Harvard.
19^8: Thornton hired by Hughes Aircraft.
19^9: Ash hired by Hughes Aircraft.
1951s Ingalls receives first Navy contract; Robert
Ingalls Sr. dies; irregularities in inventory
accounts at Hughes Aircraft noticed by accountants.
1952: Accountants at Hughes Aircraft resign.
1953: Thornton and Ash leave Hughes Aircraft and set up
Litton Industries.
1955: Lanier gets $500,000 to set up submarine and nuclear
training program.
1956: Ingalls receives first submarine contract.
1957: Ingalls receives first nuclear submarine contract.
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1958: Jamieson resigns; Litton acquires Monroe Calculating
C ompany
.
1959: Steele files suit.
1961 : Litton acquires Ingalls
.
1962: Noah Dietrich's deposition.
1965: Steele awarded $7.6 million.
I966: DiBona's article appears in U. S. Naval Institute
Proceedings
.
I968: Litton has first earnings drop; construction "begins
on new West Bank shipyard.
1969: Litton receives LKA contract.
1970 : Litton awarded DD-963 destroyer program.
1972: Proxmire chairs Senate subcommittee on Priorities
and Economy in Government; Ash appointed as director
of OMB; Gordon Rule loses position as director of
procurement
1973: Gordon Rule reinstated.
1976: Pentagon announces proposal to settle shipbuilding
claims; Litton rejects Pentagon's proposal; Litton
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target price = target cost + target profit




TC = target cost
TY = target profit
CP = ceiling price
S/L = share line
PTA = point of total assumption
PTA =





example for DD-963 ;
TC = $1.6460? billion




m = 2.1399 - (1.64607+ .14313) + 1#61+6
.85




PTA = $2.05607 "billion
FIXED-PRICE INCENTIVE, SUCCESSIVE TARGET (FPIS) CONTRACT
The fixed-price incentive, successive target contract
is the same as the fixed price incentive contract except
that a new target price can be negotiated at one or more
specified future dates. In the case of the DD-963 there
was only one reset date (within ninety days after the end
of the thirty-seventh month after the execution date of
the contract). In no case, however, can the new target
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